Armies in Lebanon 1982-84

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Background to Chaos

'In the past, we Lebanese thought our strength was our weakness. We wanted to be the merchants, the bankers, and the tourist guides of the Middle East, leaving the fighting to others. We thought that because we had no military power, nobody would attack us, nobody would fear us enough to want to fight us. The result was that today one-third of our country has been destroyed and two-thirds of it occupied by foreign armies.'—Lebanese President-Elect Bashir Gemayel, in his last interview before his assassination, 14 September 1982.

On the evening of Thursday 3 June 1982, four Palestinian gunmen critically wounded Mr Shlomo Argov, Israel's ambassador in London, as he left a diplomatic reception at the Dorchester Hotel. Although this incident was to be the immediate cause of Israel's war in Lebanon, the roots of the conflict went back many years.

Lebanon achieved its independence in 1943, after years of French rule under a League of Nations Mandate that dated back to the First World War. The country, formerly part of Syria, embraced a wide variety of religious and ethnic groupings, all mutually antagonistic. The most important were Maronite and Greek Orthodox Christians, and Sunni and Shia Muslims, together with members of the secretive Druze sect. The government was structured by an agreement known as the National Covenant, which was supposed to divide power proportionally among the various factions. This resulted in a weak central government ill-equipped to merge the rival groups into a truly national state. However, the National Covenant served the country fairly well for nearly 30 years, despite the problems of urbanisation and rising Muslim demands for greater representation. In the end, it was not a Lebanese issue that destroyed it, but the problem of the Palestinians.

South Beirut, August 1982: this Golani machine gunner ('MAGist') wears the Israeli Kevlar flak vest and helmet, and carries his weapon's ammunition belt in its shell collector bag, a common IDF practice. The MAG's bipod is also wrapped in hessian, affording a handgrip when firing the weapon from the hip. (IGPO)

The PLO in Lebanon

In 1948, following the creation of the State of Israel, some 400,000 Palestinian refugees crossed the border north into Lebanon. There, for more than 20 years, they lived in squalid refugee camps in southern Lebanon, and in a chain of ramshackle suburbs near Beirut. In 1968 the Lebanese capital became the headquarters of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, the umbrella organisation for more than 11 different political factions dedicated to the overthrow of the State of Israel.

PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat found Lebanon an excellent base for operations, both against Israel itself and Israeli and international targets abroad. In southern Lebanon, the PLO set up large and effective bases from which to carry out operations across the border into Israel. The Israeli Defense

IDF combat engineers present their weapons for an officer's inspection, prior to a patrol near Aley, January, 1983. The man on the left wears the IDF's winter parka and a captured 'woolly pully' sweater (the PLO used both British and Pakistani Army patterns). The two soldiers in the centre wear the IDF 'snowsuit' and 'Hermoniot' winter boots. (IDF Spokesman)

Forces retaliated with land, sea and air attacks on these PLO bases.

The PLO presence, and the Israeli military response it attracted, put a strain on the weak Lebanese government and the fragile political alliances it represented. In November 1969 Egypt's President Nasser forced the Lebanese to sign the Cairo and Melkart Accords, granting the PLO virtual autonomy in the refugee camps and along the 'combat front' with Israel. Following the events of 'Black September' 1970, when King Hussein's Bedouin army violently ejected the entire PLO infrastructure from Jordan, Lebanon became the only Arab country bordering Israel where the armed struggle could be continued. A further 150,000 Palestinian refugees arrived, along with thousands of PLO guerrillas, further upsetting the delicate balance of power in the country.

The weakness of the Lebanese central government alarmed both Christian and Muslim political parties, who began to form private militias to look after their interests. For their part, the PLO seized control of virtually all of southern Lebanon. The PLO fighters—bored, angry, heavily armed, and answerable to no one but their local commanders—instituted a virtual reign of terror against the civilian population under their control. Thousands of Lebanese were robbed, raped, tortured or killed. While many of the victims were Christians, the PLO did not spare their co-religionists, and Muslims (especially Shia Muslims) provided the majority of the victims. At the same time, in defiance of their obligations under the Cairo Accords, the PLO began to strengthen its ties with leftist Lebanese Muslim political factions, hoping to destabilise the Lebanese government still further.

On 13 April 1975, in the midst of this explosive atmosphere, a busload of PLO gunmen opened fire on a church in the Christian Ain Rammanah section of Beirut. Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Christian Phalange Party and one of the most powerful men in Maronite Lebanon, was present for a family baptism. His bodyguard returned fire, and the fighting escalated. The next day all hell broke loose in Lebanon.

The Lebanese Civil War, 1975–76

The Lebanese Civil War of 1975–76 caused 80,000 dead, and totally split the country along factional lines. The peace which had existed for centuries between Muslim and Christian was destroyed. Christian fought Muslim, Christian fought Christian, and Muslim fought Muslim. An estimated 50 different 'militias' came into existence, and acts of violence were both individual and collective. In Beirut, where the worst of the fighting took place, rooftop snipers shot pedestrians at random. Gunmen set up checkpoints to examine the papers of passing motorists, and anyone of the 'wrong' religion or political affiliation was killed out of hand. Battles were fought with unheard-of savagery, with prisoners saved only for torture, mutilation and death.

In January 1976 PLO units attacked the Christian city of Damour on the main highway south of Beirut. A quarter of its population of 40,000 were killed in the battle or massacred afterwards, and the remainder forced to flee. In revenge, in October 1976 the Christian militias laid siege to the Tel Zaatar refugee camp north of Beirut for 50 days. When the camp fell, no quarter was given to the survivors, and the slaughter rivalled that of Damour. By then the Christians, initially confident, were in trouble: the Palestinians had formed an alliance with other Muslim factions, and obtained the support of the Druze, the stubborn mountain people who had given the French repeated problems in the days of the Mandate.

The PLO-leftist Muslim-Druze alliance was too much for the Christian forces to handle and, in February 1976, they gave tacit support to a Syrian and Lebanese plan to end the fighting by granting concessions to the Muslims. The PLO refused to go along with the plan, however, hoping to achieve their own national state, or at the very least to gain total control of south Lebanon. As the war entered

An Israeli naval reservist scans the ruins of Tyre, June 1982. An MAG machine gun and an M-16/M203 rifle/grenade launcher lie close at hand as he speaks over an Israeli Mk.25 field radio. Note shell collector bag alongside the machine gun. (IGPO)

Israeli paratroops await the order to advance; east of Beirut, July 1982. Helmet netting is held in place by bands of inner tubing, and the lead man has taped two magazines together for his Glilon SAR (Short Assault Rifle). Also note his RPG bag. (IMoD)

Laden with zippered IDF kitbag and rolled sleeping bag, a Dragon anti-tank gunner of Brig.Gen. Yaron's paratroops prepares to be heli-lifted to the Ein el Hilweh battle, June 1982. His helmet is covered by netting and the IDF-issue rubber retaining band. (IDF Spokesman)

its second year, the desperate Christian leadership began to consider approaching the only power in the region capable of ensuring their survival: the State of Israel.

The Phalangists

The Christian community in Lebanon, diverse in denomination as well as in political beliefs, has always had its power base in a series of feudal-type family fiefdoms, much like those of the Mafia in Sicily. The three main families were the Frangiehs, the Chamouns, and the Gemayels; all of the Maronite denomination. Each had its own territories, banking and commercial interests, and political orientation. By 1976 each family also had its own militia. The Frangiehs, led by Sleiman Frangieh, had their power base in northern Lebanon around the city of Tripoli, and were known to be pro-Syrian in policy. The most corrupt of all the Christian factions, their militia, the *Marada* (named after legendary giants of Lebanon's pre-history) was commanded by Sleiman's son Tony. The Chamouns were a pro-Western faction whose leader Camille was a former Prime Minister. Camille's son Danny headed their militia, the Tigers. The third family were the Gemayels. Not only were they the best organised, but their family patriarch Pierre had founded the *Keta'ab* (literally 'of the book') or Phalange Party in 1936, following fascist patterns apparent in Europe at the time. The Phalangists were more than just a private army; they were a political force of great potential. Gemayel's two sons, Bashir and Amin, were both militia commanders at the time of the 1975–76 Civil War.

The first Phalange-Israeli contacts occurred in the spring of 1976 aboard Israeli missile boats cruising off the Lebanese coast. Further conferences were held ashore, and included visits by Israeli military representatives to Christian-held positions. The relationship flourished, and during 1976 Israeli planners provided large grants of military aid to the Christian forces.

Meanwhile, following the PLO's rejection of their truce proposal, the Syrians began to reconsider the consequences of a PLO-Muslim state in Lebanon, and withdrew their considerable support from the alliance. In July 1976 they went further, and invaded the country in support of the Christians. From the beginning, the Israelis had constantly urged the rival Maronite factions to unite against the PLO-leftist Muslim-Druze alliance. As the Civil War came to a close under Syrian pressure, the Phalangists moved to consolidate their position—not by compromise, as the Israelis had hoped, but by violence.

On 13 June 1978 Phalangist soldiers surrounded the home of Tony Frangieh and killed him, together with his wife and daughter, their bodyguards and servants, and even the family pets. On 7 July 1980 it was the turn of Danny Chamoun. A Phalangist assault force stormed his headquarters, killing 80 of his men; although Danny himself escaped and fled to Europe, the Chamouns were effectively removed as rivals to the Gemayels[1]. The Phalangists were on top, and Israel was faced with a *fait accompli*.

The election of Menachem Begin as Israel's Prime Minister in 1977 was greeted with relief by the Phalange; his hard line against the PLO meant more military aid for them. In fact, many in Israel began to dream of a united Christian-Jewish front against the Muslim Arab world around them. The Phalangist leadership took every opportunity to strengthen this idea. Phalangist officers were sent to train in Israel, and contacts were established with the Israeli political leadership. The desperate plight of the Maronite Christians, besieged in their own country and fighting for their very existence, struck a responsive chord in many Israeli leaders. The Israeli hard-liners admired the dynamic Bashir, who, for his part, continually urged Israel to intervene directly in Lebanon and rid his country of the Palestinians—and also, by this time, of the Syrian Army.

The Syrians in Lebanon

The bizarre behaviour of Syria in Lebanon can only be understood by reference to past history. Syria never accepted the partition of the country under the Mandate, and always regarded Lebanon as part of Greater Syria. For various reasons, however, they wanted an independent Lebanon, though one obedient to Syrian policies. Toward this end, in 1975, at the height of the Civil War, they sent in members of the *Saiqa* (the Syrian-sponsored PLO faction) and units of the Syrian PLA (Palestinian Liberation Army—auxiliary troops of the regular Syrian Army) to fight on the side of the Muslim forces.

However, as the PLO and its allies seemed about to triumph, Syria's President Hafez Assad sent a 40,000-man invasion force to help the Christians. Their mission was to prevent the establishment of a strong PLO state capable of resisting Syrian plans in the region. Although later sanctioned by the Arab League as part of an Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon (as were units from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya and the Sudan), the Syrians refused to leave

An Israeli paratrooper pausing on the road to Beirut, June 1982. An M-72 LAW anti-tank rocket is strapped to his pack. He has also improvised his own way of carrying the 40 mm rounds for his M-16/M203 combination. (IMoD)

[1]Lest it be thought this was all one-sided, in February 1979 Bashir Gemayel's infant daughter was killed in an ambush meant for her father.

Israeli patrol in the Beka'a Valley, November 1982. The radioman carries, in addition to his Mk.25 radio, an unusual Glilon/M203 SAR/grenade launcher combination. Further back in the column, another man is armed with an M-21 7.62 mm sniper rifle and scope. (IMoD)

the country[1]. Instead they remained, consolidating their power bases in Beirut and in the Beka'a Valley in eastern Lebanon. Following the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1980 Syria's relations with the PLO improved; the Syrians withdrew from the coastal region, turning over control to the PLO. By 1981 the Syrians were in control of two-thirds of Lebanon; ousting them had become a major goal for the Christians.

In 1981, responding to increased harassment of their troops by Christian forces, the Syrian Army laid siege to the Greek-Catholic city of Zahle. In a show of support for the Christians, the Israeli Air Force shot down two Syrian helicopters engaged in counter-guerrilla operations near the city. The Syrians responded by placing 14 batteries of Soviet-supplied SA-6 anti-aircraft missiles in the Beka'a Valley. Although the Israelis threatened to remove them by force, they were to remain in place until the 1982 invasion. By this time, many Israeli leaders began to suspect that the entire Zahle affair had been a Phalangist plot to bring the IDF directly into a war with Syria.

The Israelis

Although the Israelis were concerned with the plight of the Lebanese Christians, their primary interest in Lebanon was to secure their northern borders against the PLO. Ever since the first PLO raids into Israel from Lebanon the Israeli government has followed a firm policy of retaliating

[1]The Saudi, Yemeni and Sudanese contingents departed after a few months. The Libyan unit was largely abandoned by its government, and individual troops either deserted or made their way home as best they could.

against PLO targets throughout that country. In 1978, following a particularly vicious terrorist attack which left 33 dead, the IDF mounted a small-scale invasion of southern Lebanon (Operation 'Litani'). For three months the IDF destroyed bunkers and arms caches; but overall, the operation was not a success. The bulk of the PLO fighters simply withdrew northward out of reach of the IDF. A United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was brought in to police the area following the Israeli withdrawal, but proved useless at curbing PLO infiltration. The PLO fighters quickly intimidated the UN soldiers into leaving them alone, and soon reoccupied all their old bases. With the financial resources of the Gulf oil states behind them, their lost weapons were quickly replaced and new ones added, including tanks and artillery. (It should be recalled that the PLO is undoubtedly the best-financed guerrilla organisation in history. Instead of making do with odd lots of homemade or captured hardware, they have always been able to afford the very best on the market.)

Before their departure, the Israelis had also established a small Christian and Shi'ite militia under the command of former Lebanese Army Maj. Saad Haddad. Completely armed and financed by the Israelis, it reached a peak strength of 2,000 men. (Haddad, a Greek Catholic, was despised and reviled by the Maronite leaders, both for his co-operation with Israel and for his use of Muslims in his militia.) This was sufficient to protect Haddad's small enclave and part of the border, but could not seriously challenge the PLO. In 1981 the PLO stepped up the pressure with massive rocket and artillery attacks on the border towns of northern Galilee. The situation soon became intolerable; there were many civilian casualties, and Israeli citizens were becoming hostages of their bomb shelters. Even after US Special Envoy Philip Habib managed to mediate a ceasefire between Israel and the PLO, the Israelis began to consider several military contingencies to evict the PLO from Lebanon once and for all.

Israeli forces search for PLO terrorists at the El Baas refugee camp near Tyre, June 1982. The lead soldier, peering cautiously around a graffiti-covered wall, carries a Glilon and wears an American M69 flak vest. The man at the rear carries a folding stretcher attached to a US Army packboard. (IGPO)

Israeli patrol near Damour, June 1982. The officer's CAR-15 is fitted with current-pattern flash suppressor, Israeli-made plastic magazines, and 'rosebud' attachment for firing anti-tank grenades. (IMoD)

Three basic plans were proposed by the IDF. First, a repeat of Operation 'Litani'; second, a larger-scale operation codenamed 'Little Pines', which called for Israeli forces to occupy a zone 40 km deep north of the Israeli border to keep the PLO out of artillery range of northern Israel; and third, 'Big Pines', which called for Israeli forces to go as far as Beirut, forcing the PLO to either stand and fight or withdraw from Lebanon entirely. The first proposal was immediately discarded, and debate centred on the remaining two. 'Little Pines' was the least risky politically; but the larger plan had much to recommend it, especially since the Phalangists had promised their full military co-operation in rooting the PLO out of Beirut itself, should the Israelis advance that far. Bashir Gemayel's personal assurances convinced many top Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Begin, Defense Minister Ariel 'Arik' Sharon, and IDF Chief of Staff Lt.Gen. Rafael 'Raful' Eitan. However, many officials in both the Israeli government and IDF military intelligence opposed such collusion with the Phalange. They found them unreliable and untrustworthy, and believed they were dragging Israel into a quagmire in Lebanon. They warned that it would be dangerous for Israel to ignore the Druze and Shia minorities within Lebanon, who were sworn enemies of the Maronite Christians. 'Big Pines' also contained a risk of conflict with Syria, which could easily spread to the Golan Heights and escalate into a major war. Sharon and the hard-liners thought it worth the risk; but the debate had not been settled when the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador to Great Britain occurred.

Although the assassins were not members of the PLO proper[1], Begin immediately ordered a retaliatory air strike against targets in southern

[1]They were, in fact, members of Abu Nidal's anti-Arafat Rejectionist Front, which specialised in the murder of PLO officials abroad. One was also a colonel in the Syrian intelligence service.

Lebanon and on PLO Headquarters in Beirut. PLO artillery units responded with a two-day rocket barrage into northern Israel. Late on the evening of 5 June the Israeli cabinet agreed to the invasion of Lebanon, up to the 40 km line. The operation was codenamed 'Peace for Galilee'.

The Military Situation

Planning for the invasion of Lebanon had been under way since November 1981. IDF units began to emphasise urban infantry combat in their training, and practised rapid mobilisation and deployment along the frontier.

PLO Chairman Arafat had also known since November 1981 that the Israelis were planning something against him in Lebanon, and had made dispositions accordingly. He was able to organise three conventional formations, each of 2,000–2,500 men, made up of contingents from the various PLO factions. The Yarmouk Brigade was stationed along the coastal strip; the Kastel Brigade was in the south; and the Karameh Brigade was stationed on the eastern slopes of Mt Hermon, in the area the Israelis called 'Fatahland'. Arafat had about 15,000 fighters altogether, with 6,000 in the Beirut, Ba'abda and Damour area; 1,500 in Sidon; 1,000 between Sidon and Tyre; 1,500 in Tyre itself; 1,000 from Nabatiyeh to Beaufort Castle; 2,000 in Fatahland, and 1,000 in the UNIFIL Zone in southern Lebanon. Their heavy weapons included T-34, T-54 and T-55 tanks (mostly dug in as pillboxes), 130 mm and 155 mm artillery, multiple BM-21 *Katyusha* rocket launchers and heavy mortars.

The Syrian Army had about 30,000 soldiers in Lebanon, deployed in two main zones. In the Beka'a Valley was the 1st Armoured Division, comprising the 91st and 76th Tank Brigades and the 58th Mechanised Brigade. Attached to it were the 62nd Independent Brigade, and ten Commando Battalions. There were also now 19 SAM missile batteries. In Beirut and the Shouf Mountain area the Syrians had now deployed the 85th Infantry Brigade and 20 Commando Battalions to protect the Beirut-Damascus Highway, their main route of supply and communications.

Against these forces, the IDF planned to use some six and a half divisions, with a total of between 75,000 and 78,000 men, 1,240 tanks and 1,500 armoured personnel carriers. Further reserves were kept back on the Golan Heights, to deter a Syrian strike at the base of the Israeli advance.

The Invasion

Day One

At 1100 hrs on 6 June 1982 the Israeli Defense Forces launched Operation 'Peace for Galilee' by invading Lebanon along a 63-mile stretch of the frontier. There were three main routes of advance: first, the coastal sector from the Israeli border at Rosh Hanikra north toward Tyre, Sidon, Damour and, eventually, Beirut; second, the central sector from Beaufort Castle to Nabatiyeh, with Jezzine as the initial objective, followed by a left turn to link up with the coastal force near Sidon; and third, the eastern sector, which ran from Rachaiya and Hasbaiya toward the Syrian lines in the Beka'a Valley around Lake Qaraoun. The overall strategy was for a rapid advance along the coast, bypassing the major PLO centres, while simultaneously cutting off the PLO's escape route through the Beka'a. Thereafter, the IDF would proceed to destroy the PLO bases, equipment and personnel in the bypassed areas.

The campaign in the coastal sector opened with an advance by three brigades of the IDF's Division 91, under Brig.Gen. Yitzhak Mordechai, preceded by air strikes and artillery. Speed was essential; yet, after passing through the lines of the startled UN troops, progress slowed. The advance had to be made along a single road, which was soon a massive traffic jam from beginning to end. The road was also bordered by citrus groves, which provided good cover for PLO anti-tank teams. Their resistance was determined, if unco-ordinated. Closer to Tyre a series of ambushes imposed a further delay, and there was some heavy fighting. However, the leading IDF unit, Brigade 211 under Col. Eli Geva, was able to isolate Tyre in only nine

Maj. Saad Haddad on his way to accept Beaufort Castle from the IDF, 7 June 1982. Haddad still wears his Lebanese Army fatigues, with US Army 'baseball' fatigue cap, IDF rank insignia, and the unit patch of his militia hanging from his left epaulette in IDF style. The M-113 displays both Israeli and Free Lebanese flags. (IGPO)



hours. The plan was to bypass the city and the surrounding refugee camps of El Baas and Rachidyeh. However, one of Geva's battalions took a wrong turn and stumbled into a PLO ambush on the outskirts of the city. Amid the wreckage of tanks and APCs, the battalion commander and his driver were taken prisoner by the PLO[1]; and it took several hours to extricate the unit. As Golani[2] and Paratroop units sealed off the city and the camps, Geva's brigade halted halfway to Sidon and went into laager, Wild West style, for the night.

Along the central front, Israeli forces crossed the border at Metulla. An important initial objective was the old crusader fortress of Beaufort Castle. Situated more than 717 metres above sea level, it overlooked all of southern Lebanon and much of northern Israel; the PLO had used it for years as an artillery observation post. Its capture also had symbolic importance: the castle had been a major symbol of PLO domination of southern Lebanon. The task of taking Beaufort was given to Sayeret Golani, the reconnaissance commando unit of the Golani Brigade. Again, traffic congestion delayed the attack until after dark, allowing some PLO to escape; but the platoon-sized assault force reached its jump-off point undetected, and launched a night attack. The remaining PLO resisted stubbornly, and vicious fighting raged amid the castle's elaborate system of bunkers, trenches and pillboxes. In the end the position was cleared, partly with weapons taken from the PLO dead, and the Israeli flag went up over Beaufort. The cost had been high: the small assault unit had taken heavy casualties, including six dead and many wounded. Its commander, Lt. Mordechai Goldman, later received Israel's highest award for valour, the Ot Haoz, for his actions during the operation. The next day, with great pomp and ceremony, the Israeli Prime Minister, Defense Minister and IDF Chief of Staff formally handed over the castle to Maj. Haddad, whose people had suffered under its bombardments for years.

With Beaufort secure, two IDF divisions, the 162nd and 36th (the latter commanded by Brig.Gen. Avigdor Kahalani, the IDF's most outstanding armoured commander) pushed north on both sides of the castle toward Nabatiyeh. Over the city an Israeli A-4 Skyhawk was shot down by a hand-held SA-7 missile, and its pilot captured.

In the eastern zone, where IDF forces were controlled by a corps-level command under Maj.Gen. Avigdor Ben Gal, two IDF units, Divisions 252 and 90, pushed into Fatahland, led along secondary roads by combat engineers. Behind them were deployed two specially configured task forces: the Vardi Force, under Brig.Gen. Danni Vardi; and the Special Manoeuvre Force, under Brig.Gen. Yossi Peled. Overall, Ben Gal's objectives were to push through the PLO forces along the border and threaten the Syrians' left flank, and, if necessary, to cut off their retreat to Damascus. The Vardi Force was to take Jezzine and then push north along Lake Qaraoun. Meanwhile Peled's Special Manoeuvre Force—two brigades of paratroops and infantry especially configured for anti-tank operations—were to block any Syrian attempts at reinforcement via the Beirut-Damascus Highway. Although their deployments were primarily against the Syrian forces, IDF forces in the east were ordered not to initiate combat actions against them unless they were directly attacked.

[1]They were executed several days later, and their mutilated bodies thrown down a well.
[2]The battalions of the Golani Brigade are the only IDF infantry units which are neither Airborne nor part of armoured formations.

Day Two

During the night of 6/7 June Israeli naval commandos began landing along the coast to set ambushes for PLO forces; and the Israeli Air Force attacked targets in Beirut and throughout the south. In a dogfight over Beirut the Syrians lost one MiG-23.

On the coast, Israeli units pressed north toward Sidon, while tanks and infantry moved into the Rachidyeh PLO camp near Tyre. Many Israeli commanders had expressed reservations about fighting in the camps, which were actually urban neighbourhoods with blocks of houses separated by streets and alleys. Mixed in among them were PLO bunkers, firing positions and weapons stores, sometimes in their hundreds. Because of the large civilian population it was impossible to use air strikes and artillery, and taking the camps in a house-to-house operation could prove costly. (In 1976 the PLO had held off the Syrian Army for six days at Sidon, inflicting heavy casualties in men and equipment.) Although resistance at Rachidyeh, and later at El Baas, was moderate, it was to continue for four days—a harbinger of worse to come. In spite of this the IDF kept to a policy of moderation, choosing to move slowly, avoiding the use of heavy weapons and regarding the civilian population as hostages of their armed brethren.

Meanwhile, the coastal force linked up with Kahalani's spearheads south of Sidon, and took the city under fire with artillery. Another Israeli force crossed the border near the Haddad enclave and commenced operations against the cut-off PLO forces south of Tyre.

Later that day, the Israeli Navy mounted its largest ever amphibious landing, putting ashore a mixed brigade from Division 96 at the mouth of the Awali River near Sidon. The landing beach had been secured by naval commandos the night before. Built around the IDF's 50th Paratroop Battalion, 35th Parachute Brigade, and under command of Brig.Gen. Amos Yaron, the Paratroop and Infantry Branch Chief, the landing force arrived with over

An Israeli patrol near Sidon, June 1982: as some commence a building check, others prepare a wounded comrade for evacuation. Note how the IDF web gear makes provision for carrying the Mk.25 radio and its issue packframe. The item immediately below the radio is an additional ammunition pouch. (IDF Spokesman)

400 vehicles. Quickly breaking out of their beachhead, they linked up with the rest of their division and Kahalani's troops north and south of Sidon, isolating the city. As Israeli naval vessels shuttled in reinforcements, Col. Geva's 211th Brigade pushed north toward Damour.

Sidon and the whole coastal strip was defended by the PLO's Karameh Brigade, which offered little resistance to the landing. It was later discovered that its commander, Col. Abu Hajem, had initially belittled reports of a landing, and went to look for himself. One glance at the Israeli armada off shore was enough. He returned to his headquarters, loaded the command's safe into an ambulance, and drove into the Syrian lines in the Beka'a Valley to report the destruction of his unit by the US Sixth Fleet! Although Arafat ordered him court-martialled, his behaviour was typical of many PLO officers. (Of the senior officers of the PLO's military command, for example, the South Lebanon military commander, all three brigade commanders and 13 out of 14 PLO battalion commanders abandoned their units and fled almost immediately.) Many lower-ranking officers followed suit, leaving their men almost leaderless. Some of the PLO cadres stayed to fight well and bravely; but their unco-ordinated efforts availed their cause little.

Also on 7 June, IDF forces first entered the Ein el Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon, initially just to clear a route for their tanks. It was soon evident that this could not be done except by clearing the whole camp. A Golani battalion was ordered into the camp, but was forced to withdraw at dusk. On Tuesday morning the attack was renewed by tanks and infantry, supported by air strikes and artillery. The Golanis fought their way into the centre of the camp, but again were forced to withdraw at nightfall. The fighting was absorbing a major part of Kahalani's force, even including his élite Sayeret Shaked and Sayeret Shaldag reconnaissance units. As the camp blocked the main road, either it had to be taken or another way had to be found around the city. On Tuesday, while the IDF were still fighting in the camp, a secondary road was found to be usable, and the advance to the north continued. PLO resistance in the camp did not slacken, however, but increased. The bulk of the civilian population had already managed to flee, but some 300 PLO fighters were still holding out. Now they took the remainder of the civilians as hostages, openly shooting the faint-hearted among them in front of the Israeli troops who tried to negotiate their release. Fighting continued until the following Monday, as IDF tank/infantry teams, aided by engineers, slowly cleared the camp, street by street, house by house, room by room. The PLO defenders literally fought to the last man, and few prisoners were taken.

In the central zone, IDF units also entered Nabatiyeh on Monday. The area contained a major PLO training camp, and a strong defence was anticipated. The PLO were indeed dug in, with a regular battalion and six T-34 tanks; but the commander had fled, and the camp fell in three hours with no Israeli casualties. Alongside the camp's defenders the IDF also collected a large number of foreigners, international terrorists who had been in training in the camp. In total the IDF rounded up some 1,800 of these in southern Lebanon, from 26 countries and five continents.

In the eastern sector, Ben Gal's troops continued their cautious advance, bringing Syrian positions and missile batteries within artillery range. Although some isolated clashes occurred, for the most part the Syrians avoided a fight, even withdrawing to permit the IDF an unhindered pursuit of fleeing PLO forces.

Christian Phalangist 'Special Forces' confer with an IDF patrol in Beirut, August 1982. They wear Syrian copies of Pakistani camouflage uniforms, and black berets with Phalange commando badges (see Plate D1). They are armed with Swiss SIG 540 assault rifles, and an array of personal sidearms. Note bullet loops on gunbelt of man at right, beneath a Syrian/PLO AK-47 chest pouch. (IGPO)

Day Three

On Tuesday 8 June Yaron's force, having secured its communications by the secondary road around Sidon, resumed its advance toward Damour. In air battles over Beirut and southern Lebanon six Syrian MiGs were downed; and fighting continued in the refugee camps around Sidon and Tyre. Although the battle for Ein el Hilweh was to rage for another week, the Israelis were able to secure Sidon itself; and El Al, the Israeli national airline, thoughtfully opened an office in the city.

In the central sector, the Vardi Force attacked the town of Jezzine, the site of a vital road junction. It was defended by a mixed PLO-Syrian force, recently reinforced by a Syrian tank battalion and a commando unit. Both Syrian and Israeli units had orders not to fight each other; but the road junction was too important, and the Vardi Force was finally directed to attack. Eight IDF tanks were lost, but the Syrians lost all their T-62s and the town was firmly in Israeli hands by nightfall. Although the IAF flew support missions during the battle, the nearby Syrian missile batteries did not engage them. Clearly, President Assad was still hoping to avoid a direct confrontation.

The other Israeli operation on the central front was a different story. It was a direct threat to the whole Syrian position in the Beka'a. As the Vardi Force fought for Jezzine, a second unit, Brig.Gen. Menachem Einan's Division 162, pushed around it and advanced northward. Its first objective was Beit en Din in the Shouf Mountains, but its ultimate assignment was to cut the Beirut-Damascus Highway, sealing off the PLO and Syrian forces in Beirut. This action would also cut off the Syrian units in the Beka'a Valley. As Einan's spearheads advanced northward, hampered only by traffic jams and gasoline shortages (at one point the exasperated Einan ordered his tanks to pull into a local filling station and gas up, telling the owner to bill the IDF later!), the Syrians brought a new weapon into the field. Just after 1530 hrs, Syrian Gazelle helicopters attacked one of Einan's units with French-made HOT anti-tank missiles. To add to Einan's troubles, two of his battalions travelling on adjacent roads got into a battle with each other, and it took several hours to straighten them out and evacuate casualties.

In the eastern sector, things were relatively quiet.

Christian Phalange troops in training in the Shouf Mountains, 1983. They are completely clothed and equipped by the IDF, from helmets to combat boots, and are armed with AK-47 and M-16 rifles. The shoulder patch is that of the Phalange's 'Lebanese Forces'. (IMoD)

Peled's Special Manoeuvre Force had, by evening, taken up its blocking positions at the southern end of the Beka'a Valley. The Syrian position in Lebanon was rapidly deteriorating, and their units were deliberately being placed in an impossible tactical situation.

Day Four

Wednesday 9 June was a momentous day. In the coastal sector, Yaron's forces reached Damour. Since the expulsion of the Christians the city had become the headquarters of the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, founded by Dr George Habash. The PFLP faction had turned its abandoned houses and natural caves into a fortress. Nevertheless, it fell after heavy fighting.

In the central sector, Einan had continued his drive for the Beirut-Damascus Highway late into the night of 8/9 June. At about 2300 hrs his leading elements were approaching the Druze village of Ein Zehalta, deep in the Shouf Mountains. As the tanks began to descend a steep road, bordered by a deep wadi, the leading crews caught sight of the silhouettes of Syrian tanks on the opposite side. The leading platoon opened fire, scoring three hits, just as they themselves were engulfed in a withering barrage of anti-tank shells and RPG rounds. Nearly a full Syrian brigade had been lurking in ambush in the wadi. The Israeli tanks were strung out along the mountain road above them, just like targets in a

shooting gallery. As the surviving vehicles pulled back to regroup, Syrian commandos crept among them with RPGs. The withdrawal quickly became a rout. With dawn, fighting resumed, but by then it was too late. The brigade had bought time for other Syrian units to deploy and, scant kilometres short of his objective, Einan had lost his chance to cut the Beirut-Damascus Highway. The Syrians, however, would pay a high price for their success.

By now, Israeli forces were well beyond the 40 km advance announced and agreed upon by the Cabinet on Saturday 5 June. Defense Minister Sharon now insisted that the whole campaign would be for nothing if the PLO were not completely destroyed. If that also involved fighting Syria, well, better now than later. Events at Ein Zehalta provided him with an additional argument; Einan would need air strikes to extricate his unit, and air superiority could not be guaranteed without first destroying the Syrian missile batteries in the Beka'a. The American government was extremely angry about the 40 km pronouncement, especially as it had been redefined several times while the Americans were working for a ceasefire. Many Israeli Cabinet Ministers wondered openly what the US government would think of a major escalation of the war. Sharon, however, insisted that it was a matter of Israeli lives; and, after a brief presentation by the IAF's Deputy Commander, the Cabinet authorised the attack.

At 1400 hrs on the 9th, the IDF executed a well-planned, carefully co-ordinated attack on the 19 Syrian missile sites in the Beka'a Valley. The planning had been done months before, and the operation carefully rehearsed. First, Israeli-made Scout and Mastiff RPVs (Remote Piloted Vehicles) simulated actual aircraft closing on the Syrian positions, forcing the Syrians to turn on their fire control radars. The signals from these were analyzed and pinpointed, then jammed with a variety of techniques. Next, as Israeli artillery shelled the positions within their range, 96 IAF aircraft—F-4Es, F-15s, F-16s and *Kfir* C-2s—attacked the remaining Syrian positions, concentrating on their radars and support vehicles. Several of the Soviet-supplied missile systems were mobile; but, as they attempted to move, a second

Israeli paratroops of the airborne reconnaissance unit *Sayeret Shaked* during the fighting for the Ein el Hilweh refugee camp, June 1982. The man on the left wears standard IDF web gear, with an additional ammunition pouch added above the webbing's integral pouch at the rear. His helmet netting is camouflaged with brown shoe polish, and the straps from his kneepads can also be seen. The 'MAGist' has an obsolete Israeli-made British '37 Pattern Small Pack to hold extra 7.62 mm belts. (IGPO)

wave of 92 IAF aircraft struck, using American-supplied 'smart bombs' and conventional explosives. At least one SA-8 battery was taken out by an RPV with an ammunition payload. Within an hour, 17 of the 19 SAM missile batteries were destroyed, and the other two damaged, without the loss of a single Israeli aircraft—a remarkable accomplishment indeed.

In a desperate attempt to save their missile defences, the Syrian Air Force was committed in strength against the second IAF air strike. With their operations co-ordinated by E-2C Hawkeye and Boeing 707 surveillance aircraft, the IAF pilots were able to engage the Syrian aircraft to advantage. No less than 41 Syrian aircraft were shot down in three major air battles, for a loss of no Israeli planes—a tribute to the IAF's technical skill and superior pilot ability. Altogether, the Syrian Air Force would lose a total of 91 aircraft over Lebanon, including the latest MiG-23 and MiG-25 types, plus six helicopters, without being able to claim a single aerial victory in return. Their aircraft losses represented about a quarter of their Air Force and many of their best pilots. From then on, the Syrians made only sporadic attempts to challenge the Israelis in the air, and their ground forces were left without air support for the rest of the war.

On the ground, Einan resumed at daybreak the battle for Ein Zehalta by flying in a battalion of paratroops by CH-53. The Syrians resisted stubbornly, and it took all day to drive them out. More paratroops, of the special anti-tank unit Sayeret Orev, were sent out to ambush Syrian armour in the Jebel Barouk mountains, using jeeps fitted with TOW anti-tank missiles. Meanwhile, on the opposite side of the mountains, Ben Gal opened a three-pronged offensive against the Syrian 1st Armoured Division in the Beka'a Valley.

Day Five

Thursday 10 June brought the Israeli forces on the coast nearly to the outskirts of Beirut and, for the first time, into direct contact with Syrian units of the 85th Brigade at Kfar Sil.

In the central sector, Einan finally broke through to Ain Dara overlooking the Beirut-Damascus Highway, which the Syrians stubbornly defended with their 62nd Brigade. With air superiority assured, however, Einan called in Israeli helicopter gunships, Bell 209 Cobras and Hughes 500 Defenders, which launched a devastating attack on the Syrian armour. The helicopters took a heavy toll of Syrian tanks, and the survivors fell back from the town.

Israeli Golani sniper near Beirut, August 1982. The M-21 ('accurised' 7.62 mm M-14) was the standard IDF sniper's weapon during the Lebanon war. This particular weapon has been modified by the addition of a bipod, apparently one from a sniper's version of the Galil. (IGPO)

In the east, Ben Gal's troops, greatly hampered by the difficult terrain and limited road network, finally broke through the lines of the Syrian 1st Armoured Division at a crucial road junction at about 1500 hrs. The Syrians, in turn, called on their own helicopter gunships, and the Gazelles found the stalled Israeli columns good targets for their missiles. To their horror, the Israeli tankers found that the Syrian HOT missiles outranged their own heavy machine guns, and there was little they could do about the situation. Nevertheless, Ben Gal pushed ahead, determined to exploit his breakthrough with a night advance.

At dusk one of his leading battalions drove through the village of Sultan Yakoub, only to have its leading elements cut off in a Syrian ambush. Unknown to the Israelis, the battalion had driven straight into the assembly area of the Syrian 58th Mechanised Brigade, which was coming up to the support of the 1st Division's battered tank brigades. As darkness fell, the trapped Israeli tank crews could sense that the hills were swarming with enemy commando teams. Heavy machine gun fire kept them away during the night, but Israeli attempts to break through to the trapped unit failed. At dawn,

An Israeli M-113 crew of Peled's Special Manoeuvre Force near Yanta, Beka'a Valley, July 1982. They wear OR-601 tanker's helmets, the oldest of the three patterns of CVC helmets used by the IDF. (IDF Spokesman)

the Syrian artillery fire intensified. The battalion commander radioed for air support; this never arrived, and the unit also suffered the indignity of a Syrian air strike by two MiGs. With ammunition running low, the Israeli battalion made a dash for it, supported by artillery, and escaped. The unit had suffered heavy casualties, and a number of its vehicles had been left behind. There had been no time to destroy them, and the Syrians were able to tow away the M60s with much of the secret equipment aboard still intact.

Also on Thursday 10 June, Peled's Special Manoeuvre Force had pushed north against scant opposition. Just short of the Beirut-Damascus Highway Peled was ordered to pull back, as it was felt to be too risky for him to try to maintain his advanced position. On the extreme right flank of the Israeli advance, an IDF brigade also reached the Beirut-Damascus Highway at Yanta, although it had been considerably harassed both by commando units and by Syrian helicopter gunships. Israeli aircraft were called in against the gunships, and they also fought another air battle against the Syrian MiGs: 25 MiGs and four helicopters were shot down, without Israeli losses.

Day Six

On Friday 11 June the Israeli and Syrian governments agreed to a ceasefire, to start at noon. It would not apply to the PLO. During the morning the trapped Israeli battalion at Sultan Yakoub made good its escape. As the unit regrouped, a second armoured force was seen approaching. It was the Syrian 82nd Armoured Brigade, part of the 3rd Armoured Division, which had just come up from Damascus with its brand-new T-72 tanks. In a mirror-image of the previous night's Israeli error, it casually drove into the midst of the Israeli concentration, to lose nine of its tanks in a matter of minutes. As the ceasefire came into effect at noon, IDF commanders had to plead for permission to counterattack the Syrians in Sultan Yakoub, at least to recover the abandoned enemy tanks. The decision went all the way up to the Prime Minister;

but permission was refused, and the ceasefire stood. Although many of their units had been badly battered, the bulk of the Syrian forces in the Beka'a Valley had made an orderly withdrawal to the vicinity of the Highway.

In the east on the morning of the 11th, Israeli aircraft, artillery, and naval units bombarded Beirut, while Israeli forces closed a ring around the Lebanese capital. The town of Khalde fell, the last PLO stronghold south of the city; and IDF troops reached the outskirts of Beirut International Airport. A final air battle cost the Syrian Air Force a further 18 MiGs just before the ceasefire went into effect.

The False Truce

The ceasefire with the Syrians was extended to include the PLO on Saturday 12 June, but there were frequent violations by all sides. On Sunday, IDF units linked up with Phalangist forces at Ba'abda, the site of the Lebanese Presidential Palace. This came after a major battle with Syrian units of the 85th Brigade, who were trying to prevent the IDF from cutting their communications with Damascus. By then the PLO had largely fled back to Beirut, where their position was grim. Although they had about 14,000 fighters in the city, together with the Syrian forces, the Christian militias held the eastern half of the city and the IDF the southern approaches. The only way out was the Highway.

Meanwhile, Israeli officials met with Phalangist leaders and members of the Gemayel family. The Israelis expected them to be jubilant, but found them subdued and evasive. Sharon inquired when the Phalangist troops would be joining in the battle: Bashir Gemayel muttered that he'd do his best, and then tried to change the subject. Sharon would have none of it; echoing Bashir's own words, he shouted

Israeli mechanised troops near Sidon await their turn to board the landing ship INS *Bat Sheva*, during a redeployment to new positions along the Awali River line, 4 November 1982. Several variants of M-113s are visible, including a TOW missile launcher (centre). The stowage racks of at least two vehicles are neatly filled with infantry packboards. (IGPO)

Urban warfare in West Beirut, August 1982. PLO and Mourabitoun guerrillas hid and fought everywhere, and apprehension is apparent on the faces of these two Golani soldiers. The lead man wears an IDF Kevlar flak jacket, and his companion an American M1952 type; both are armed with M-16s. (IGPO)

at him: 'We're here with tanks! *Do something!*'

The day the IDF entered Ba'abda, PLO officers watched through binoculars from the roofs of Beirut apartment buildings, then reported the news to Yasser Arafat. Until then the PLO Chairman had refused to believe reports that the IDF was closing in around him. The link-up with the Phalange caused panic among the PLO leadership. While some of his officers changed into civilian clothes and tried to leave town, Arafat called on the Syrian commander in Beirut to ask what instructions he had from Damascus. The Syrian general refused to tell him. Expecting a full-scale IDF attack on his disordered forces at any moment, Arafat ordered the PLO archives to be burned. Only after the job was nearly completed did someone remember that no one had bothered to microfilm them first[1].

However, the Israelis were still negotiating with the Phalange and, for the moment, restricted their operations to improving their positions along the Highway. In south Lebanon, the IDF continued a methodical destruction of PLO bases and arms dumps, and the rooting out of the PLO infrastructure in the area. The Israeli government was determined to give the PLO no chance of escape, however, and the battle for the Beirut-Damascus Highway was resumed on 22 June, with the Israelis attacking all Syrian and PLO positions south of the Highway at Bhamdoun, Mansouriey and Aley in the Shouf Mountains. The fighting for Aley was particularly bitter, because the defenders included a contingent of volunteers sent by the Ayatollah Khomeini to fight the 'enemies of Islam'. Both sides took heavy casualties in major fighting; but by 25 June the Syrians were forced to withdraw to Chtaura, well to the east of the approaches to Beirut. The Israelis now surrounded the city on three sides by land, and the Israeli Navy controlled the ocean approaches. The second phase of the Israeli invasion was about to begin.

The Siege of Beirut

The Israeli Army was never meant to enter, let alone capture, Beirut or any other Arab capital. Yet there were some 14,000 PLO fighters in the city[2]; and unless they were forced to leave, the campaign could not be considered a success. In addition, certain factions of the Israeli Cabinet, led by Defense Minister Sharon, saw the removal of the PLO as a necessary precondition to the formation of a new Lebanese government, headed by Bashir Gemayel, which could effectively control the country. Never before had the IDF been used to achieve political ends, especially in another sovereign nation, and the situation created a moral and political dilemma within Israel. There was also the problem of Beirut's civilian population, who would certainly suffer severely in a siege or, far worse, an all-out assault on the city. The American government had already warned that it would not tolerate the massive slaughter of innocent civilians; and, after a week of despair and confusion, the PLO had made a remarkable recovery and now began talking about a Lebanese Stalingrad. PLO positions were placed where civilian density was

[1]The Israelis had captured a duplicate set in Sidon, and eventually the PLO was able to negotiate for their return.

[2]A good 7,000–8,000 PLO fighters had managed to flee to Beirut from the battles in the south, joining the 6,000 already in the city.

greatest, such as in the basements of apartment buildings; and the PLO announced that, whatever the consequences for the Lebanese population, *they* would fight to the last man. After Ein el Hilweh, there was no doubt they would carry out the threat. The Israelis opted for a full-scale siege of Beirut, which began officially on 1 July.

There were more than 500,000 civilians trapped in West Beirut, and the IDF's first task was to get as many of them as possible to leave. After a day of leaflet drops and mock bombing runs using flares, the IDF opened its lines to any civilians who wished to leave the city. Thereafter, two checkpoints were left open for this purpose, and eventually 100,000 Lebanese escaped in this fashion. The IDF also tried to ease out the Syrians, offering the 85th Brigade a safe-conduct out of the city; but President Assad refused and the unit stayed until the end of the siege. (It had, however, lost two-thirds of its men and all but one of its tanks in the June fighting south of the city, and took no part in the siege itself.) To deal with the more than 14,000 PLO and 2,000 Muslim Mourabitoun militiamen, well dug in on familiar territory, the IDF began a full-scale bombardment of their positions by land, sea and air. Although occasionally interrupted by ceasefires, this was to continue throughout the siege. The Israelis initially shut off food, water, gas and electricity to West Beirut; but as the PLO had abundant food stocks, this only hurt the civilian population, and the municipal services were restored after a few days. Also, starting on the 3rd, the IDF moved into East Beirut and began a series of limited attacks on PLO positions across the 'Green Line', which had divided Christian from Moslem parts of the city since the 1976 Civil War. Following the pattern set at Ein el Hilweh, the attack orders stressed a slow, careful advance, with abundant armour and artillery support.

For their part, the PLO replied to Israeli bombardments with their own artillery, demonstrating their resolve and their ammunition reserves. The artillery duel continued throughout the early part of July, rising to a peak on the 9th, when the IDF turned 27 batteries of captured PLO *Katyusha* rocket launchers on PLO positions, and bombarded them with their own ammunition. Western reactions to these operations were becoming increasingly negative, and extensive television coverage caused many a once-friendly government to condemn the Israeli actions vehemently.

Even in Israel itself, public opposition to the government's handling of the situation increased. The controversy was further aggravated by the Geva Affair. When neither the bombardments nor the negotiations seemed to be having the desired effect, the IDF prepared a major operation to invade West Beirut itself. Col. Eli Geva, who had led the coastal advance at the head of his 211 Brigade, was picked to lead one of the main attacks. Geva resigned his command in protest, however, insisting that Israel had no right to interfere with Lebanon's internal affairs or take the lives of its citizens. His offer to stay with his unit as a private soldier was refused, and this brave and capable officer was instead dismissed from the service.

Meanwhile, operations continued as military targets in other parts of the city were hit, often with Maverick or naval Gabriel missiles, or with 'smart bombs' used against specific structures. Artillery 'snipers' fired against certain PLO-occupied buildings, or even parts of buildings. Arafat, suspecting that Begin had determined to kill him personally, succumbed to a kind of paranoia and changed his location every few hours. The Israelis announced their plans to stay in Lebanon for the winter, and engineers completed a new airstrip at Nabatiyeh.

After the landing of his artillery unit near Sidon, a first lieutenant (*Segev*) commanding an M-109 SP gun scans a proposed route of advance. He wears the Nomex tanker's coveralls, and carries a Glilon on a badly worn sling. To minimise their reflection, the ID tag around his neck has been strung inside a shoelace, and the tag itself covered with black tape. (IGPO)

Occasional fighting also continued in the Beka'a Valley between Israeli and Syrian forces. On 23 July Israeli intelligence discovered that three batteries of SA-8 missiles had been brought in; the next day, IAF aircraft destroyed them.

The siege continued into August, while negotiations stalled over where the PLO might go if they were withdrawn. As US Special Envoy Philip Habib shuttled throughout the Middle East, trying to get various governments to accept the PLO, the Israelis stepped up the military pressure. On 1 August the Golani Brigade took Beirut International Airport after some of the heaviest fighting of the war. On 4 August the IDF launched its long awaited drive into the city, feinting first at the Port Crossing, and then striking south from the city's Museum Crossing and northward through the Ouzai district. The object of the drive was to cut off the PLO camps of Bourj el Barajneh, Sabra and Shatila from PLO Headquarters in the city. By nightfall, after heavy fighting, the camps were cut off on three sides.

On 11 August IDF forces moved north out of East Beirut toward the port of Junieh, positioning themselves for a possible move toward the city of Tripoli—a PLO stronghold in northern Lebanon. On 19 August, after a final series of attacks on their positions in Beirut, PLO officials agreed to a withdrawal under international supervision. A Multi-National Force, made up of troops from France, Italy and the United States, would provide the PLO with protection as they departed by sea and air to other parts of the Middle East. On the 21st the MNF was in place, and the first PLO contingent departed. The siege was over. During the next 12 days a total of 14,398 Palestinian fighters and Syrian soldiers left Beirut: the PLO by sea, and the 85th Brigade and its PLA auxiliaries under safe-conduct along the Beirut-Damascus Highway. The MNF departed after 16 days, its mission accomplished.

Captured Syrian commandos at a detention facility inside Israel. Their uniforms are the Syrian 'lizard' pattern camouflage, with US-type M-65 field jackets. The orange berets indicate Syrian political 'Special Troops' but, according to neutral journalists, many Syrian soldiers in Beirut adopted them 'apparently to impress the local girls'. The IDF intelligence officer addressing them wears the winter parka and olive-brown General Service beret. (IMoD)

The Illusion of Victory

Both the PLO and Israel claimed victory—the PLO because it had survived, the Israelis because they had removed the threat to their northern borders. Sharon even flew in Maj. Haddad to witness the PLO evacuation. Operation 'Peace for Galilee' had cost the Israelis 368 dead and 2,383 wounded in six weeks of fighting, a heavy price relative to the Israeli population. Although the PLO fired off tens of thousands of rounds to celebrate their 'victory', they had lost 1,500 dead and an unknown number wounded—and their entire political and military infrastructure in Lebanon, which it had taken them 15 years to build. Some 8,000 PLO and PLO suspects were captured and detained by Israeli authorities at the Ansar Detention Facility at the Arnoun Heights. Syrian losses were almost as high: 1,200 dead, approximately 3,000 wounded, and 296 prisoners. Materiel losses were also high.

Lebanese civilian casualties, although hard to estimate exactly, were thought to be 4,000–5,000 dead and about four times that many wounded. IDF directives to minimise harm to civilians and their property undoubtedly kept these totals lower than might be expected, given the nature of the fighting. The directives were strictly enforced, and it is interesting to note that not one incident of criminal behaviour was charged against IDF soldiers by the Lebanese.

The Lebanese elections were held on 23 August, in the midst of the PLO evacuation. As expected, Bashir Gemayel was elected President by an overwhelming majority. His supporters were ecstatic with joy and added their cheers, shouts, and

1: Israeli paratrooper, 202nd Abn.Bde.; Beirut, 1982
2: Israeli paratroop 'MAGist'; Shouf Mts., Feb.1983
3: Israeli infantryman, Golani Bde.; S.Lebanon, June 1982

1: Israeli Naval Commando; Sidon, June 1982
2: Israeli Navy missile boat officer; Beirut, Aug.1982
3: Israeli Air Force Kfir C-2 pilot, June 1982

1: Israeli tank officer; Damour, July 1982
2: Israeli MP; Ansar camp, Oct.1982
3: Israeli Border Guard; Tyre, July 1982

1: Officer, Phalangist 'Lebanese Forces'; Beirut, Sept.1982
2: Militiaman,'Lebanese Forces'; Beirut, Dec.1983
3: Militiaman, Maj. Haddad's 'South Lebanese Army'; June 1982

1: Syrian commando, 1st Cdo.Gp.; Beka'a Valley, July 1982
2: Syrian T-72 tank crewman; Beka'a Valley, June 1982
3: Syrian commando, 85th Bde.; Beirut, 1982

1: PFLP guerrilla; Damour, June 1982
2: PLO sniper; Beaufort Castle, June 1982
3: PLO officer; Beirut, Aug.1982



1: PFLP-GC guerrilla, Kastel Bde.; Sidon, June 1982
2: Mourabitoun militiaman; Beirut, Sept.1982
3: Druze militiaman; Aley, Feb.1984

1: French paratrooper, 3e RPIMa; Beirut, Oct.1983
2: Italian Marine, 'San Marco' Bn.; Beirut, Aug.1983
3: US Marine, 24th MAU; Beirut, Oct.1983
4: Tpr., 1st The Queen's Dragoon Guards; Beirut, Oct.1983

Israeli Brig.Gens. Menachem Einan and Amos Yaron supervise the withdrawal of the Syrian 85th Bde. from Beirut, 23 August 1982. The BTR-60 is adorned with the ubiquitous posters of Syrian President Assad, without which no public event in that country is complete! (IDF Spokesman)

wild gunfire to the noise from the waterfront, where the PLO was conducting its own 'victory celebration'.

The New Order in Lebanon

Lebanon now seemed ready for a new chapter in its history, with the PLO driven out of Beirut and the coastal strip. Yet, for President-Elect Gemayel scores of problems still remained: there were almost 100,000 foreign soldiers in his country, and his political supporters had not had time to consolidate their power. Unhappily, 'consolidation' in Lebanon has always meant bloody vengeance; and first on Bashir's list were the Druze. The Phalange requested permission to move 1,000 fighters into the Israeli-controlled Shouf Mountains to secure their control of the region. The Israelis refused, fearing a bloodbath. Also, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt had never allowed PLO units to operate within his territory; and during the invasion he had not fought against the Israelis, even though they supported his arch enemies the Phalange. The Phalange also wished to enter South Beirut in force to deal with the Shi'ite Amal political organisation and its militia. The Shi'ites, long oppressed by the PLO, had also avoided conflict with the Israelis, and their leader Nabih Berri had even provided rosters of his fighters as a symbol of trust.

Prime Minister Begin also pushed for rapprochement between the Gemayels and Maj. Haddad, and encouraged Bashir to make a state visit to Israel as a first step toward normalising relations between the two countries. Bashir rejected the second proposal completely. As for Haddad, Bashir indicated that something might be done for him, after he had stood trial for treason in Beirut – 'a mere formality'. Although incensed by his behaviour, the Israeli government continued its unrelenting support for Bashir.

On 14 September 1982, as Bashir addressed a weekly meeting of a women's youth group at Phalange Party headquarters in Beirut, a bomb explosion demolished the building. Bashir was killed, along with 26 other members of the Party hierarchy. His political success had been built upon violence, and by violence he had died; yet his death was only the beginning of a far more serious crisis for his Israeli supporters. With Bashir dead, who would now control Lebanon; and could they keep out the PLO[1]?

The Israelis were certain that there were at least 2,000 PLO fighters still at large in West Beirut, together with a further 2,000 Mourabitoun militiamen, who were still making occasional attacks on IDF forces. In the aftermath of Gemayel's assassination Israeli forces occupied West Beirut in the hope of preventing further violence. Bitter street fighting took place between IDF units and the resistance centred on the Bourj el Barajneh, Sabra and Shatila camps. With Ein el Hilweh still fresh in their minds, the Israelis did not wish to enter the camps, and tried to persuade the previously neutral Lebanese Army to undertake the task. Unwilling and probably incapable of performing the mission, the Lebanese Army refused. The Phalange, however, who had taken no part in the siege of Beirut, now offered a contingent of its militia under Fadi Frem and, with few other options, Defense Minister Sharon reluctantly agreed to let them clear the camps of PLO fighters.

IDF military intelligence chief Maj.Gen. Yehoshoua Saguy warned that permitting the Phalange into the camps would result in carnage, but he was overruled. Between 15 and 17 September, Phalangist forces entered the Sabra and Shatila camps and massacred over 700 innocent Palestinian civilians. Although large arms caches were recovered, only two Phalange soldiers were injured during the

[1]In the light of what happened later, it is interesting to note that the assassin was not a PLO agent, as was generally supposed, but a member of the Syrian National Party, a pro-Syrian faction within the Phalange.

operation. Worse massacres had happened before in Lebanon; but this one had taken place under the very noses of IDF forces sent into Beirut to prevent exactly what had taken place. Israel received most of the international blame for the massacre. The IDF withdrew from the city and allowed the Lebanese Army to resume control. A second Multi-National Force also returned to Beirut to protect its inhabitants from one another. Italian and French troops patrolled West Beirut, including the refugee camps where the massacres occurred, and US Marines took over Beirut International Airport and a district of Shi'ite slums adjoining it. Amin Gemayel, Bashir's older brother, was elected President, and slowly tried to establish his control over the country. Meanwhile, American diplomats sought an agreed basis for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon.

The Second Civil War and the War Against the MNF

From September 1982 until February 1983 Lebanon was relatively quiet. IDF forces had withdrawn from the Beirut area to positions in the Shouf Mountains; but isolated attacks on IDF forces still occurred. After one of these, IDF units in pursuit confronted US Marines of the MNF in what almost became an armed clash. At the beginning of 1983 battles took place between Christian and Druze forces in the Shouf, and the Israelis had to play the dangerous rôle of intermediary between the two factions. In the Beka'a, occasional clashes still occurred with Syrian forces.

During this period American diplomatic efforts continued in an effort to find a solution acceptable to all parties. Certain elements saw these talks as contrary to their interests and, on 18 April 1983, a bomb exploded outside the American Embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people. Jihad-al-Islami ('The Islamic Holy War'), a fanatical Shi'ite terrorist group with ties to both Syria and Iran, claimed responsibility. Nevertheless, on 17 May accords were signed between Israel, Lebanon and the United States.

Syria refused to comply with the withdrawal phase of this agreement and increased its pressure on Amin Gemayel's weak government through its Druze and Shi'ite proxies. President Assad also managed to force the PLO out of its last enclave in northern Lebanon by backing a revolt against Yasser Arafat led by PLO Col. Abu Mussa. With Syrian support, Mussa's radical PLO troops surrounded Arafat and his supporters in their stronghold city of Tripoli in June 1983. For a second time in a year he found himself under siege; and a second evacuation, this time under French auspices, was arranged in December. Arafat and his men were once again sent off into exile. Profiting from the Lebanese experience, most of his host countries disarmed the PLO contingents on their arrival, and shipped them off to various desolate parts of their countries. Mussa, his usefulness at an end, was then imprisoned in Damascus.

Meanwhile, in August 1983, Israeli forces unilaterally withdrew from the Shouf Mountains to positions on the Awali River. Their place was to be taken by the newly revitalised Lebanese Army, American-equipped and American-trained. The transition did not go as planned, and the Druze forces engaged in bitter fighting against the government's troops. The United States had now

Israeli paratroops enjoy a captured PLO magazine, near Damour, June 1982. One man wears the old-style IDF fatigue cap. Also note the IDF's method of boot lacing. (IDF Spokesman)



become deeply involved in Lebanon, and was determined that the Lebanese Army should not be defeated. Starting in September, when Druze forces moved against the town of Souq el Charb, US warships, including the battleship *New Jersey*, fired in support of the government troops. The United States was now perceived in many circles as just another foreign army attempting to assert its influence in Lebanese affairs.

On 23 October a truck laden with explosives drove into the headquarters of the US Marine battalion at Beirut airport. Its explosion killed 241 US servicemen and the driver. Moments later a similar suicide truck bomb destroyed the French military headquarters in West Beirut, resulting in the deaths of 58 French paratroopers. Jihad-al-Islami again claimed responsibility, and warned of further attacks. The group was based in the town of Ba'albek in the Syrian-controlled Beka'a Valley, which seemed to implicate the Syrian government to some degree. French aircraft from the carrier *Foch* retaliated with an air strike against Ba'albek, but failed to hit the terrorist bases. In the United States, pressure was brought on President Reagan to bring the Marines home. On 4 November the Israeli headquarters in Tyre was also destroyed by a suicide truck bombing—again, the work of the same group. Twenty-three Israelis died in the explosion and, although the IAF retaliated with an attack on Ba'albek, public opinion in Israel also demanded a withdrawal.

In early December Syrian forces fired on US reconnaissance planes over the Beka'a Valley, and the US responded with an air strike from the carrier *Independence*. As a demonstration of American resolve, it was a failure; the Syrians shot down two of the jets, including that of the Air Group Commander, and captured one of the pilots. There were no further US air strikes.

By January 1984 the Lebanese Army had been defeated by the Druze and Shi'ite militias, and had split along factional lines. As Druze and Shi'ite forces pushed down from the Shouf and took control of South and West Beirut, the Lebanese Army fell apart. The Muslim troops deserted to the militias, while the Christians, trapped south of the city, streamed south across the Awali River, seeking sanctuary behind the Israeli lines. Amin Gemayel's status had been reduced effectively to that of mayor of East Beirut; and with the Multi-National Force departing in March, he had no choice but to go to Damascus and consult President Assad on the future of his country. Naturally, he was first required to renounce the American-sponsored 17 May agreement with Israel.

Members of the élite IDF Druze reconnaissance unit observe Syrian positions in the Beka'a Valley, November 1982. Web gear is worn over winter parkas, with helmets or fleece-lined caps. The nearest man is armed with the Glilon SAR with attached forward pistol grip, and also carries an American Kabar combat knife on his webbing. (IGPO)

The war in Lebanon ruined the careers of Prime Minister Begin and Defense Minister Sharon, both of whom resigned over various aspects of their handling of the war and its aftermath. The IDF still remains in southern Lebanon, conducting a phased withdrawal from the country. An Israeli-trained South Lebanon Army still patrols the Haddad enclave[1], awaiting the day when the IDF will be gone and they must fend for themselves. Peace has been brought to Galilee, at least for the moment.

[1]Maj. Saad Haddad died of cancer in 1983.

Infantry and Paratroop Branch Chief, Brig.Gen. Amos Yaron, scans Sidon on 8 June 1982. Additions to his web gear include (top to bottom, at rear) a grenade pouch, an extra ammunition pouch and a map case. The IDF web gear is an ingenious and versatile system, adaptable to the various needs of modern combat troops. Even the asymmetrical arrangement of ammunition pouches provides the soldier with an elbow rest when firing. The device worn on the general's shoulder is a pilot's survival mini-flare projector. (IMoD)

but the cost has been high. At the time of this writing, over 600 Israeli soldiers have died in Lebanon.

The Plates

A1: Israeli Paratrooper, 202nd Airborne Brigade; Beirut, 1982

This paratrooper ('Tzanhan'), fighting in the approaches to the Lebanese capital, is wearing the standard issue olive fatigue shirt and trousers. The trousers have a large pocket on each side, closed with a buttoned flap. The left leg only has a smaller pocket, used to carry money and cigarettes. He also wears the Israeli-manufactured Kevlar 'Shahpats' (flak vest), first issued in 1981 to replace the American M1952 type, which also remains in use. The 'Ephod' web gear, in service with frontline units since 1977, holds twelve M-16, AK-47 or Galil magazines, along with two canteens, grenades and an entrenching tool. Additional pouches for medical equipment, 7.62 mm FN MAG machine gun belts and 40 mm grenade rounds can also be added. The helmet is the Israeli-manufactured infantry ballistic helmet. Made by Orlite of one-piece, reinforced plastic composite structure, it is sturdy, light and comfortable. The helmet netting, crudely camouflaged with spots of brown shoe polish, is held in place by a tan rubber retaining band, an issue item. The Israeli-made brown leather paratroop boots are both lighter and stronger than the black leather type issued to other IDF units. The radio is also Israeli-made, a copy of the American AN/PRC-25. It is carried in a tan rucksack. The weapon is the shortened version of the Galil rifle, called the Glilon by the IDF. Note its shortened barrel; many soldiers add a second pistol grip. The standard Galil is also used, with built-in bipod or attachment for the M-16 bayonet. There is also a sniper version of the basic rifle, with bipod and scope.

A2: Israeli Paratrooper 'MAGist'; Aley, Shouf Mountains, February 1983

The winters in Lebanon are known for their harshness and bitter cold. In the mountains east of Beirut falls of up to 24 inches of snow can be encountered. To protect the soldiers who had to live and conduct operations in this climate, the IDF issued protective clothing, such as the 'Beged Horef' (winter suit) worn by this paratrooper. Designed especially for the Lebanese winter, it was issued to almost all personnel. Made of insulated material with a waterproof exterior, it resembled the tanker's coveralls in many ways. The fur-lined hood has slits for radio headphones and other communications equipment. Some, but not all suits had the IDF nametape above the left breast pocket. The boots are Israeli-made 'Hermoniot' snow boots, fur-lined for extra warmth. For further protection this soldier wears a captured PLO *kefiyah* as a scarf; when worn inside Israel, the *kefiyah* unofficially identified a Lebanon veteran. The gloves and goggles are also issue items. As a 'MAGist' (machine gunner), this man carries a spare belt for his 7.62 mm FN MAG light machine gun. Attached to the weapon is a canvas bag to collect expended shells, which can also be used to hold the 7.62 mm belt before action. Cloth has been wrapped around the bipod, a

standard practice to make a comfortable handgrip for holding the weapon.

A3: Israeli 'Golani' Infantryman; Beaufort Castle, Southern Lebanon, June 1982

This 'RPGist' of the élite Golani Infantry Brigade wears the standard fatigue uniform, Israeli Kevlar flak vest and standard IDF webbing. His helmet netting is camouflaged with black shoe polish and held in place with a strip of rubber inner tube, cut to fit the helmet. The black 'Elba' combat boots are a special type, issued only to the 'Golani', to provide greater support and comfort during the unit's long marches. He is armed with the standard 5.56 mm Galil rifle. Along with other Galil variants, it has become the mainstay of the IDF, with AK-47s and AKMs being issued to commando and special forces units, the M-16 to reservists and rear-echelon troops, and the 9 mm UZI SMG to Air Force, Naval and female personnel. In the IDF all infantry and mechanised soldiers have dual (and sometimes triple) weapons, medical and communications tasks. Besides their personal weapons, each man is trained (and required) to carry and use a second piece of equipment; e.g. a field radio, 66 mm LAW rocket, M203 40 mm grenade launcher, Dragon A/T missile, A/T rifle grenades, FN MAG light machine gun, 52 mm light mortar, medical equipment or, as in this case, a Soviet-made RPG-7. This weapon became standard in the IDF after large numbers were captured in the early 1970s and during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The IDF was so impressed by its effectiveness that they decided to produce it themselves, and it is now made by Israeli Military Industries. Its ammunition bag is locally produced and can hold up to six rounds. This soldier also wears the kneepads issued to IDF personnel for this campaign. Most troops found them cumbersome, and they were little used. A unit

Israeli combat engineers during mopping up operations in Jezzine, June 1982. White tape on back of helmet is for station-keeping on night marches. The centre man wears socks in typical Israeli fashion. Also note how the Galil's bipod folds neatly out of the way when not in use, allowing him to keep a comfortable grip on the weapon at all times. (IMoD)

Syrian units of the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) withdrawing from Beirut, 23 August 1982. (These are auxiliary troops of the Syrian Army, and not PLO fighters.) They wear Soviet steel helmets and green fatigues. The centre soldier is equipped with one type of indigenous Syrian Army web gear, including two AK magazine pouches, a smaller pouch for the weapon's oiler and cleaning kit, and canteen with carrier. (IDF Spokesman)

affectation is the Golani Brigade insignia worn on the wristwatch cover band.

B1: Israeli Naval Commando; near Sidon, June 1982
The 'Kommando Yami' (Naval Commandos) are one of the IDF's most élite forces, going through a demanding 18-month training programme. They perform a variety of tasks, ranging from underwater demolitions to intelligence gathering, and are also used as shock troops. During Operation 'Peace for Galilee', the Kommando Yami carried out a large number of assignments, mostly classified in nature. During the first days of the war they landed at strategic points along the coastal highway to ambush both PLO reinforcements heading south, and PLO units fleeing north. These missions were extremely successful. This commando is wearing the black summer diving suit of neoprene rubber. His diving boots are made of the same material, with strengthened soles. He is still wearing his black buoyancy vest and compensator, which means he was either brought ashore by rubber boat, or has stashed his oxygen tanks at a point where he would have to swim to retrieve them. His web gear is shoe-polished black; waterproof sealers inside the pouches keep ammunition and equipment dry. Swim fins are carried on his back, attached to the wet suit by a canvas strap. He is armed with the AK-47, the main weapon of IDF élite units. He also carries a silenced .22 Beretta pistol for sentry removal (hidden from this angle) in a black left shoulder holster, and a diver's knife strapped to his right leg.

B2: Israeli Missile Boat Weapons Officer, INS 'A'atzmaut'; off Beirut, August 1982
The Israeli Navy ('Heyl Hayam') played a major rôle in Israel's Lebanon campaign, conducting amphibious operations and supporting the ground advance with naval gunfire. During the siege of Beirut they bombarded Palestinian positions in the city with both conventional gunfire and Gabriel missiles. This *Seren* ('Captain' in the Army sense—the IDF does not have a separate rank system for the Navy, and all personnel hold Army ranks) serving aboard a Saar 4 missile boat wears an IDF fatigue shirt with US-made OG 106 Nomex fire-resistant trousers. Usually missile boat crews are issued one-piece Nomex coveralls, but it is not uncommon for crews to have individual variations. The device painted on the Navy blue fatigue cap is the 'Satil' (missile boat) emblem. The blue waist belt and blue/yellow rank insignia are peculiar to the Navy. He wears a French-style life preserver around his waist. His boots are the standard issue black combat type, with zippers placed alongside the laces; this is a common practice among naval and armoured personnel, who have only seconds to go from alert to battle conditions.

B3: Israeli Kfir C-2 Pilot, June 1982
The Israeli Air Force has long been regarded as among the best in the world, and in the summer of 1982 their high reputation was further enhanced. In addition to destroying the Syrian air defence system in the Beka'a Valley at one blow, they shot down 91 Syrian MiGs and six helicopters, and provided close air support for the IDF throughout the campaign. All this was achieved for the loss of one Skyhawk fighter-bomber and a Bell 205 medevac helicopter to ground fire. This 'Tayas' (pilot) of an Israeli Kfir C-2 fighter-bomber is wearing Israeli copies of the American K-2B flight suit and HGU-26P single-visor pilot's helmet. The rest of his equipment is of Israeli design and manufacture. His Type 817(IS) cutaway Anti-G Suit is made of Nomex fire-resistant fabric, with one clear map pocket above each knee. The suit contains a replaceable neoprene inflatable inner

bladder. He also wears an Israeli-made life preserver and survival equipment. The survival pouches, worn on a harness connected to the life preserver, contain survival gear, radio, medical supplies, and a holster for the 9 mm Beretta pistol worn at the back. Israeli-made flying boots complete his equipment.

C1: Major, Israeli Armoured Corps; Damour, South Lebanon, July 1982

This *Rav Seren* (major), the second-in-command of an armoured battalion, wears the Israeli-manufactured 'Sarbal' tanker's coveralls of flame-retardant Nomex. Although hot to wear in warm climates (not to mention inside a tank), they offer maximum protection against fire—the tank crew's most dangerous enemy. Officer's slip-on rank insignia are worn on the epaulettes. The major also has the newest Israeli ballistic tanker's helmet: the Type 602 helmet shell is light, made primarily of Kevlar, and incorporates the MK 1697 communications system. The ID tag ('Diskeet') worn around the neck is covered in black cloth to minimise reflection, especially at night. (Two more ID tags are worn in the boot tops, to provide more effective and quicker identification in case of death.) The black combat boots are standard IDF issue. The officer carries a 9 mm Browning pistol as a personal sidearm; the British-style canvas holster can also accommodate a variety of other weapons, including the 9 mm and .22 Beretta pistols favoured by many Israeli officers. The Lebanon campaign once again proved the Israelis masters of armoured warfare. As a weapon system the new Merkava MBT proved superior, not only to the T-55 and T-62, but even to the latest T-72. The Merkava was also able to withstand individual anti-tank weapons such as the RPG-7 and the 'Sagger' missile.

C2: Israeli Military Policeman; Ansar detention camp, October 1982

This 'Shoter Tzvai' (military policeman) wears standard IDF fatigues with the new issue Kevlar flak vest. Although this is now the main issue, many rear echelon units wore the older American M1952 type in Lebanon. The white-painted helmet is the Israeli version of the US M1; both it and the brassard bear the Hebrew letters '*mem*' and '*tzadeh*' for 'MP'. His web gear is an older type used by the IDF from the late 1950s to the early '70s; originally intended to hold FN magazines, the pouches now carry those for the M-16. The use of this pattern of webbing is now limited to reservists and rear echelon troops. The MP's M-16 rifle is now the most common weapon among support units within the IDF, although he might also be issued the 9 mm UZI SMG. In Lebanon, Israeli Military Police were assigned numerous tasks, ranging from traffic control to preventing arms smuggling by returning IDF personnel. (A favourite souvenir of combat troops was a captured AK-47 or Tokarev pistol.) However, their most important task was running the Ansar detention facility on the Arnoun heights. There they were responsible for security and administration for the thousands of PLO terrorists, sympathisers and allied Muslim militiamen captured by the Israelis in Lebanon. Until they could be sorted, and then either transferred to more secure facilities or released, the Military Police were responsible for an average 5,000 prisoners a day, with a peak of nearly 8,000 at one time.

Fighters of a Main Force PLO (Fatah faction) unit near Nabatiyeh, a month before the Israeli invasion. They wear both green and pale khaki fatigues with high-topped commando boots, and are armed with AK-47s and (extreme right) an RPD LMG. Note Chinese stick grenade tucked into a side pocket of the nearest man's PLO/Syrian chest pouch. (Courtesy Fatina Husseini)

C3: Israeli (Druze) Corporal, Border Guards; Tyre, Lebanon, July 1982

The 'Mishmar Hagvul' or Border Guards are

responsible for guarding the frontiers of the state of Israel, ports of entry, and areas occupied by the military against infiltration by guerrillas and terrorists. Personnel serve for three years and, even though the Border Guards are part of the Israeli National Police rather than the IDF proper, the service is considered as completion of the national military obligation. Those taken into the ranks of the 'Mishmar Hagvul' are usually Israelis whose roots lie within the Arab diaspora, and who speak Arabic. Another source of personnel are the Druze Moslems; citizens of Israel, they also serve in the IDF and other security units. As part of the Police, the Border Guard's uniform has quite a different appearance to that of the IDF soldier. For one thing, they are the only unit in Israel to wear their berets in the field. On the dark green beret is worn a silver-plated 'Star of David' badge with the Hebrew letter '*mem*' for 'Mishtera' (Police). Their field uniforms are surplus American OG 107 fatigues. Over the left breast pocket the 'Mishmar Hagvul' nametape is worn with light blue Hebrew lettering. Boots and web gear are standard IDF issue. The Border Guards have their own system of rank insignia, using British-style chevrons. This is to differentiate Police from the Army, and also recalls the Jewish Police in Palestine during the British Mandate.

Young Ashbal ('Lion Cub') guerrilla from a pro-Syrian PLO faction (note Syrian commando badge worn on uniform) at the UNRWA school at the Ein el Hilweh refugee camp, Sidon, in 1982, prior to the Israeli invasion. He is wearing the indigenous PLO 'lizard' pattern camouflage uniform, with ChiCom chest pouch and Syrian pistol belt. His weapon is a Soviet AKMS assault rifle. (Courtesy Fatina Husseini)

D1: Officer, Christian Phalangist 'Lebanese Forces'; Beirut, September 1982

The 'Lebanese Forces' (not to be confused with the official Lebanese Army) is the name given to the military arm of the Kata'eb or Christian Phalange Party. Organised into a fighting force by their leader Bashir Gemayel, the Lebanese Forces today have an estimated 5,000 well-trained men, and can count on a further 5,000 fighters from other Christian militias in case of emergency. Ever since the Lebanese Civil War of 1975–76 the Lebanese Forces have received huge amounts of Israeli military aid, everything from weapons to uniforms and equipment. Consequently, these Christian soldiers took on a rather distinctive Israeli appearance. This *A'askari* (officer) is wearing an Israeli fatigue shirt and Israeli-supplied ex-American OG 107 trousers. A Lebanese Forces nametape is worn on the shirt, and the Kata'eb party insignia on the right pocket. The cloth patch on the sleeve identifies this officer as belonging to a Lebanese Forces command unit. His pistol belt and black combat boots are Israeli; the holster for his 9 mm Browning is locally made; and his rifle is a 5.56 mm Swiss SG 540, formerly the property of the Lebanese Army. An M-16 or an Israeli-supplied AK-47 (from captured Arab stocks) might also be carried. The black beret is not issue, and is probably a personal preference. It is decorated with a Commando Unit insignia.

D2: Christian Militiaman, Phalangist 'Lebanese Forces'; East Beirut, December 1983

This militiaman, in the Christian half of Beirut, is wearing the kind of assortment of clothing, weaponry and equipment which has become typical of the various militias in Lebanon. Here, the

latest American BDU camouflage uniform is worn with Israeli fatigue cap, boots and web gear. It is very difficult to track down the origins of all these odds and ends. In addition to aid from the Israelis, the Christians purchase a large part of their supplies on the open market, and also make use of captured enemy stocks. The brown Israeli paratroop boots are also interesting: even though many Lebanese Forces personnel were trained in Israel, few, if any, became parachute qualified. However, as the boots evoke 'élite force' status, they have become a favourite among the Phalange forces. The M-16 rifle is the main issue within this Christian army. This particular example is fitted with a small 3-power optical sight. He also has a Smith & Wesson revolver in a black leather holster. In Lebanon, where weapons are considered a sign of machismo, the more weapons carried, the greater the individual's prestige.

D3: Militiaman, Major Haddad's 'Southern Lebanese Army'; Nabatiyeh, June 1982

This militia was established in 1976, under former Lebanese Army Maj. Saad Haddad. Its purpose was to curtail PLO activity directed against the inhabitants of southern Lebanon. Both Christians and Moslems joined, although the command structure remained predominantly Christian. Maj. Haddad immediately allied himself with the Israelis, and military co-operation between them flourished: his forces were supplied by Israel and many of his troops received training at Israeli military bases. In 1978, when the IDF was obliged by political pressure to withdraw from southern Lebanon, the area was left to UNIFIL—the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon. When the UN soldiers proved unwilling or unable to curtail PLO infiltration, Maj. Haddad's army provided a buffer protecting Israel's northern frontiers. During the 1982 campaign Haddad's forces took an active rôle in combat operations and, in many cases, acted as scouts for advancing Israeli units. This militiaman wears a basically Israeli uniform of bush hat, fatigues and combat boots. His canvas web gear is locally made, and modelled on the ChiCom type. The four main pockets accommodate a wide variety of rifle magazines; smaller pouches at each side hold grenades, and there are also spaces for canteens. He is armed with an M-16/M203 rifle/grenade launcher combination, and also carries an AK-47 recently taken from a dead PLO guerrilla. The unit tag attached to the left epaulette is almost identical in style to IDF tags, and is issued to all militia members: the motif combines the images of the Cedar of Lebanon and a fist brandishing a sword.

Phalangist leader Bashir Gemayel in Christian East Beirut, May 1982. Already, at the age of 34, an experienced politician and militia commander, he had by this time ruthlessly suppressed all opposing Maronite factions to make himself sole leader of Lebanon's Christian community. His later assassination while President-Elect was to have bloody consequences for all of Lebanon. In this photo, taken at a military ceremony, he wears IDF fatigues with 'Lebanese Forces' nametape; his shoulder patch is that of a command unit of his militia (see Plate D1). (*Al Masira*)

E1: Syrian Commando, 1st Commando Group; Beka'a Valley, July 1982

The Syrian Commando Battalions are among the most effective and experienced units within the Syrian military. In the Syrian Army camouflage uniforms are issued to commando units, airborne troops and certain categories of political police within the Armed Forces establishment. This soldier's uniform is a Syrian copy of a Pakistani

Three members of the original Multi-National Force pose for the obligatory handshake: Port of Beirut, 26 August 1982. From left to right, they are a French 3e RPIMa paratrooper, a US Marine and an Italian Carabinieri military policeman. Note that the American has neither a magazine in his weapon nor even ammunition pouches—one of the ways the Marines emphasised the 'non-confrontational' nature of their original mission. Neither of the other contingents seems to have followed suit; the Italian MP is armed with a Beretta pistol, a BM-59 Mk ITAL rifle and a bayonet! Note the 'Army' presentation of the Italian contingent patch, as compared with the 'Marine' version shown in Plate H3. (IGPO)

camouflage suit. (Past references to it as a British DPM variant are incorrect.) His Soviet helmet has a cloth cover in the same material. His personal equipment also shows a strong Soviet influence. The RPG bag, three-pocket AK-47 magazine pouch and canteen are all of Russian patterns. In his tank-killer rôle, he carries an RPG-7 and a haversack filled with RKG-3M anti-tank grenades, the latter capable of penetrating 165 mm of armour. He is also armed with a Soviet AKM assault rifle.

E2: Syrian T-72 Tank Crewman; Beka'a Valley, June 1982

Syrian armoured forces bore the brunt of the IDF's thrust into the Beka'a Valley, and suffered severely as a result. Compared with their previous performances the Syrian tank crews did well, tenaciously standing their ground and often fighting with great skill. Collectively, however, they were unable to deal effectively with Israeli armour, and finally had to relinquish the anti-tank mission to commando units and anti-tank helicopters. This crewman wears the typical uniform of Syrian armoured and mechanised troops in the Lebanon campaign. With the black padded Soviet tanker's helmet, he wears the tan khaki fatigues issued to armoured and non-élite, non-political units within the Syrian military. A slightly different green uniform is also issued. It is interesting to note that the Syrian Armoured Corps does not issue fire-resistant clothing to any of its units. The tanker's personal weapon is a Soviet 7.62 mm Tokarev pistol.

E3: Syrian Commando, 85th Brigade; Beirut, 1982

This commando soldier, attached to the Syrian forces in Beirut, wears the Syrian 'lizard-pattern'

camouflage uniform with standard fatigue cap and an American-type M-65 field jacket. He also carries a US-made AN/PRC-25 radio, used by the Syrian Army since the early 1970s.

F1: PLO (PFLP faction) guerrilla; Damour, June 1982
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is a pan-Arabist, pro-Marxist terror group which, under the leadership of Dr George Habash, became famous in the 1970s for a series of airliner hijackings. Its stronghold was the former Christian city of Damour, which it defended fanatically against the IDF in 1982. This *Mujahadin* ('freedom fighter') guerrilla wears a mixture of indigenous PLO and Syrian uniform, including the PLO 'lizard pattern' trousers and a Syrian Army undershirt. Although this one is loose, his *kefiyah* is typically worn in this fashion to conceal identity. He is armed with an RPG, its rounds stuffed casually into a sports bag, and, oddly enough, an American M-16 rifle. By an examination of serial numbers on captured weapons, the Israelis discovered that many of these were originally part of American arms shipments to Saudi Arabia or Jordan, which had 'somehow' been diverted into PLO hands.

F2: PLO sniper; Beaufort Castle, Southern Lebanon, June 1982
The PLO made use of a tremendous variety of camouflage uniforms, many unique to their organisation. This man wears one of these indigenous patterns, originally seen during the 'Black September' crisis in Jordan during 1970. This type is usually worn by officers, instructors or 'commando' units within the PLO, and indicates some kind of élite status. He is also wearing the PLO

French MNF troops of the crack 2nd Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment (2e REP) prepare to move into West Beirut, September 1982. They wear green berets with the silver badge of the French Troupes Aéroportées; otherwise they are dressed and equipped as in Plate H1. Scarves in company colours are worn on the left shoulder; triangular patches of the same colours are also marked on the rear of the helmet covers. The squad sharpshooter is armed with the FR F1 7.5 mm sniper rifle; the others carry bullpup-configured 5.56 mm FAMAS F1 rifles. (IGPO)

copy of the ChiCom AK-47 chest pouch, locally made in PLO factories and the main type in use. His boots are copies of the French *patauga* canvas boot, with rubber soles. His solid red *kefiyah* is also supposed to indicate élite status, although other patterns might be worn. He is armed with a Soviet 7.62 mm Dragunov SVD sniper's rifle; very few of the PLO received this much-coveted weapon, and many PLO had to resort to crudely attaching sniper-scopes to AK-47s. Others made use of Western sniper rifles obtained from friendly Arab states or purchased from arms dealers around the world. This man has added a small Palestinian flag to his web gear, also a common practice.

F3: Officer, PLO; West Beirut, August 1982
This *Qaid* (commander) of a PLO unit operating in the approaches to the Lebanese capital is wearing Iraqi combat fatigues, possibly indicating that he belongs to the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), a Baghdad-based separatist PLO faction. Like many PLO officers, he wears a red beret with PLO badge, an eagle with the Palestinian colours on its chest and the Arabic word for 'Palestine' below. His *kefiyah* is worn as a scarf, a common practice among PLO fighters. He is armed with a Czech CZ 52 7.62 mm pistol and the Hungarian version of the AK-47, the AMD-65, easily identified by its folding stock, flash hider, forward pistol grip and shortened barrel. The Karl Zeiss field glasses show that the PLO can afford to purchase the very best equipment offered for sale on the international arms market.

G1: PLO (PFLP/GC) guerrilla? Kastel Brigade; Sidon, June 1982
One of the 'regular' PLO formations established by Yasser Arafat in late 1981, the Kastel Brigade was made up of personnel from all the various PLO factions. Among the contributors was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine/General Command, a pro-Marxist terror group with about 1,500 fighters. They achieved their status within the PLO by a series of attacks inside Israel, of which the most important were those on a school bus in 1970, and against a nursery school at Ma'alot in 1974. In 1982, at Sidon, they conducted a vicious six-day defence of the Ein el Hilweh refugee camp against the IDF, holding their own civilians as hostages and forcing the Israelis to take the camp house by house. This *fedayeen* is wearing a locally-produced copy of an Egyptian paratroop uniform with a PLO AK-47 chest pouch. He is armed against all eventualities with a Polish PMK-DGN-60 assault rifle fitted with a LON-1 grenade launcher for PGN-60 anti-tank grenades, and an SA-7 anti-aircraft missile launcher.

G2: Mourabitoun Militiaman; West Beirut, September 1982
The *Mourabitoun* ('Guardians' or 'Saviours' in Arabic) are a leftist Muslim militia whose main base of power lies within the immediate Beirut area. Hoping for a Marxist Arab state in Lebanon, they have been involved in factional fighting against Christian and government forces for more than ten years. They are well armed by the Syrians and Libya, and, as militias go in Lebanon, they are well organised and highly disciplined. During the 1975–76 Civil War and the 1982 Israeli invasion they fought alongside the PLO. This *Mouqatin* (fighter) wears a Syrian 'lizard pattern' uniform and a red-painted Soviet helmet bearing the Arabic word '*Mourabitoun*'. He is armed with a 7.62 mm Tokarev pistol, an RPG-7 and a slung West German Heckler & Koch G3A3 rifle. It is unclear how much of the militias' weaponry was actually obtained, but it is safe to assume that the West German rifle was originally part of a weapons shipment to some Middle Eastern country, or was purchased on the international arms market using funds provided by one of the oil-producing Arab states.

G3: Druze Militiaman; Aley, February 1984
The Druze sect, living in the Shouf mountains of Lebanon overlooking Beirut, are long-term veterans of the political in-fighting which constitutes Lebanese politics. During the Israeli invasion the Druze remained neutral; but when Amin Gemayel refused to grant them and their leader, Walid Jumblatt, the expected political representation, the Druze fought the Lebanese Army—and later the American Marines at Beirut Airport, which lay directly below their positions in the mountains. This Druze machine gunner wears a Pakistani camouflage uniform, also used by Syrian forces and, strangely enough, by certain units of the Christian 'Lebanese Forces'. It is interesting to note that the

A Legion paratroop section NCO with Israeli soldiers during the PLO evacuation, September 1982. The Israeli major wears the new-style fatigue hat and carries an M-16. His IDF nametape is worn above the left pocket. The légionnaire is armed with a FAMAS F1 and carries a TR-PP-11-B radio. (IMoD)

Druze militia wore a variety of battle dress, depending on whom they were allied to and what other armed forces were occupying their territory. For example, it was common to see them wearing Israeli winter parkas, American BDUs and Syrian boots and helmets. The woollen cap, however, is common to Druze throughout the Middle East. The man is armed with a Soviet RPD LMG and an American .38 snub-nose revolver tucked in his belt.

H1: French Marine Paratrooper, 3e Régiment Parachutiste d'Infanterie de Marine; MNF, Beirut, October 1983

France's contribution to the Multi-National Force was drawn from 'intervention' units of her 31st Brigade and 9th Marine and 11th Parachute Divisions. Among these was the 3e RPIMa. One of the original units sent to Beirut in August 1982, they were serving there again in October 1983. In general, the French brought less naiveté to their MNF duties than some of the other contingents, the 3e RPIMa in particular: 25 years before they had been Col. Bigeard's legendary 3e RPC (Colonial Parachute Regiment) of the Algerian War, and they had had several later postings to Africa and the Middle East. Among these was a difficult tour with UNIFIL in 1978, during which they lost, among others, their colonel—badly wounded in a PLO

US Marines of the 32nd MAU survey a Phalangist road block decorated with posters of Bashir Gemayel; Beirut, September 1982. (IMoD)

ambush. The tour in progress in October 1983, codenamed 'Diodon IV', involved 3e RPIMa, detachments from several other units, and a *régiment de marche* assembled specifically for service in Lebanon in September 1983. Formed from conscripts who volunteered for extended service in Beirut, it drew companies from several other paratroop units and received the temporary designation '6e Régiment d'Infanterie Parachutiste'. It was this unit which was the target of the 23 October suicide bombing, which cost the lives of 58 French soldiers, mostly members of 3e Cie., 1er RCP (Régiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes). Men of 3e RPIMa helped dig out their crushed bodies.

This para wears the red beret, once the mark of the Colonial paratroops (since renamed 'Marine' regiments) but now worn by all parachute infantry except the Legion regiment. The Colonial/Marine badge is unchanged: a gold anchor, with a silver winged fist holding a sword superimposed. Standard French Army Mle 1964 'Satin 300' fatigues are worn with black 'ranger' boots; a company-colour scarf at the shoulder; the recently issued Mle 1974 web equipment; and a right sleeve brassard for insignia. This always bore the tricolour national flash, and sometimes a formation insignia – here, the patch of the 11e DP. A national shield was also worn on the left upper sleeve. Ranking, on tabs fixed to the Velcro patch on the jacket fly, was sometimes removed for patrols. The weapon is the 5.56 mm FAMAS F1. Its bayonet hangs on the left thigh, and a triple grenade pouch—copied from the old US pattern—is taped down to the right thigh.

H2: Italian Marine, Battaglione 'San Marco': MNF, Beirut, August 1983

Italy contributed the largest number of troops to the MNF—some nine battalions rotated through Beirut at various times. Included were three battalions of 'Folgore' paratroops, three of Bersaglieri, one of regular infantry and an armoured car unit, the 'Cavalleggeri di Lodi'. Carabinieri acted as military police and the Navy contributed its 'San Marco' Marine battalion, shown here. They were assigned to the Sabra and Shatila districts; although they generally reached a good relationship with the Palestinians, they still suffered two fatalities.

Italian Marines and paras wore the characteristic Italian camouflage clothing; the other units, olive drab. Headgear varied from unit to unit, including the red beret of the paratroopers; the blue-tasselled red fez of the Bersaglieri (who also wore white-painted Mod.33 helmets with a plume of dark green rooster feathers on the right side); and black and midnight blue berets with various branch badges.

This Marine wears a black beret with a silver anchor-and-rifles badge. He has laid aside his camouflage jacket for a pale khaki shirt, worn with the unit's red and yellow dress scarf. The shirt bears the Italian national 'star of Savoy' on the collar points; a yellow and red 'Lion of St Mark' unit chest patch; and a national arm shield peculiar to this unit, and thus perhaps of Navy origin—the other units wore a shallow tricolour flash outlined yellow. He carries the 9 mm Beretta M12 SMG, and his webbing is limited to an American M1956 pistol belt—British or local patterns were also seen. The Italians seem to have been short of winter clothing, and photos show some paratroopers wearing IDF parkas.

H3: US Marine, 24th MAU; MNF, Beirut, October, 1983

The Marines America sent to Lebanon were provided by two Marine Amphibious Units assigned in rotation to the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (MARG), Sixth US Fleet: the units were 32nd (later, 22nd) MAU and 24th MAU. Each in turn was built around a Battalion Landing Team of the 8th Marine Regiment, out of the 2nd Marine Division at Camp Lejeune—BLTs 2/8 and 1/8, respectively. 24th MAU was on duty on 23 October 1983 and its BLT 1/8 suffered most of the 241 US fatalities. At the time of the Beirut deployment, Marine uniforms and equipment were in a period of transition. This sergeant wears the older 'Woodland' camouflage uniform now being phased out; made of 100% cotton, it was in fact cooler and more comfortable than its successor, the 'Battledress Uniform' or BDU. The new PASGT (Personal Armor System, Ground Troops) protective vest was also just replacing the older M1955 type. Made of Kevlar, it offers protection against both shrapnel and high velocity projectiles. The sergeant's rank insignia, a metal pin-on device, is worn on the fly. The PASGT system also includes the Germanic-looking ballistic helmet dubbed 'the Fritz'; but, except for some Embassy Guards at the very end, the Marine contingent wore the familiar M1 steel helmet, with 'Woodland' camouflage cover, shown here. Web gear is the new nylon ALICE type ('All-purpose, Lightweight, Individual Combat Equipment'). Either black leather combat boots or the Vietnam-type jungle boots could be worn. The Remington 870 riot gun is issued for some special purposes by the Marine Corps.

H4: Trooper, 1st The Queen's Dragoon Guards; BRITFORLEB, Beirut, October 1983

A company-sized British contingent served with the MNF from February 1983 to February 1984. The original unit was C Sqn., QDG, replaced from August to December by A Sqn., and from then until final withdrawal by a squadron of 16th/5th The Queen's Royal Lancers. All were equipped with antique Ferret armoured cars. Quartered in a building in south-east Beirut, the British were the only MNF contingent not to suffer casualties in Lebanon. (Although in September 1983, the number of 'wild rounds' striking their exposed billets led the BRITFORLEB commander, a paratrooper, to vigorously request a more active stance for his force.) This QDG trooper wears a midnight blue beret with silver double-headed eagle badge, standard British tropical-weight DPM camouflage clothing, national contingent patch, and M69 flak vest with British 'fifth pattern' cover.

Italian 'Folgore' paratrooper disarming a mine near the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian camps. He wears a dark red beret with the paratroopers' winged parachute and sword badge, and Italian pattern camouflage fatigues (cf. Plate H2). These have padded reinforcements at shoulder and knee and—not apparent here—tightening straps below the knees. Again, note small rectangular national flash worn by all units except the 'San Marco' Marines.

Notes sur les planches en couleur

A1 Tenue de combat verte normalisée; gilet blindé *Keshet* fabriqué en Israël, casque, et équipement personnel '*Ephod*'; fusil '*Galil*' (version plus courte du '*Galil*'). Les bottes marron caractérisent le parachutiste israélite. **A2** Tenue et bottes spéciales d'hiver. Le sac en toile sur la mitraillette est utilisé pour contenir les ceintures de munitions et pour recueillir les boîtes de cartouches vides. **A3** Le *RPG-7*, pris sur l'ennemi en quantités en 1973, est maintenant fabriqué en Israël. Tous les fantassins israéliens doivent maîtriser une deuxième arme ou élément d'équipement en plus de leur propre fusil. L'écusson de brigade sur le poignet n'est pas officiel.

B1 L'équipement personnel de sangles, noirci au cirage de bottes, possède des joints étanches à l'intérieur des poches. Le *AK-47* est l'arme habituelle des forces spéciales *IDF*. **B2** Les officiers de la marine d'Israël ont les mêmes grades que l'armée – ce personnage est un *Seren* ou capitaine de l'armée. Des tenues anti-incendie *Nomex* sont la tenue normale sur les navires-missiles *Saar 4*. La coiffe de corvée de marine bleue, fabriquée aux Etats-Unis, porte un écusson de navire-missiles jaune. **B3** Des copies fabriquées en Israël de la tenue de vol américaine *K-2B* et du casque *HGU-26P* sont portées avec la tenue anti-gravité et l'équipement de survie israéliens.

C1 Ce major porte les bleus de l'équipe de char d'assaut *Sarbal* israélien confectionnés en tissu Nomex et le casque du type 602 dernier modèle. **C2** Les troupes d'arrière ont un matériel personnel de sangles démodé et des fusils M-16. **C3** Les Gardes de Frontière – *Mishmar Hagvul* – sont souvent des *Druzes* ou des juifs orientaux de langue arabe. Le béret vert et les chevrons de rang de type britannique sont particuliers à ce service.

D1 Officier de milice *Phalange* portant une tenue israélienne; écusson de parti *Kata'eb* sur la poche et écusson d'épaule de l'unité de quartier général. Le béret noir est un article d'équipement personnel et non officiel. **D2** Tenue typiquement mixte, comportant une coiffe, des bottes et un équipement israéliens et un uniforme américain '*BDU*'. **D3** Tenue et équipement totalement israéliens avec insigne de la milice *Haddad* sur patte d'épaulette de style israélien.

E1 Copie faite en Syrie de l'uniforme de camouflage du Pakistan et matériel soviétique. **E2** Les équipes de chars syriens ne reçoivent pas de tenues non-inflammables. **E3** Tenue de camouflage 'lézard' syriennes, avec une veste semblable au modèle américain *M-65* portée par dessus et une coiffe de corvée syrienne.

F1 Pantalons de camouflage 'lézard'; le sac de sport contient des fusées *RPG-7*. **F2** Un de plusieurs modèles d'uniformes palestiniens, confectionné sur place et porté par officier, instructeurs, etc. Le fusil de tirailleur *Dragunov* est très populaire. **F3** L'uniforme de type iraqien suggère que ce personnage appartient à la faction basée à Bagdad du *PLO*. De nombreux officiers du *PLO* portent des bérets rouges.

G1 Copie confectionnée sur place de l'uniforme de camouflage des parachutistes égyptiens; fusil d'assaut polonais équipé de lance-grenades. **G2** Partisan marxiste portant un casque soviétique peint en rouge avec inscription '*Mourabitoun*', et uniforme de camouflage 'lézard' syrien. **G3** Les milices *Druze* portent des uniformes et des équipements de nombreux types, selon leur alliés du moment.... Cet homme porte une tenue de camouflage du Pakistan/de la Syrie et le bonnet en laine *Druze* typique.

H1 Uniforme et équipement réglementaires français; béret rouge de parachutiste avec insigne de parachutiste de marine; drapeau national et insigne de *11e Div. Para.* et fusil *FAMAS*. **H2** Béret de Marine noir, avec insigne ancre-et-fusil; écusson de poitrine 'lion de St. Marc' et écharpe; insigne national sur l'épaule, étoiles sur le col; pantalons d'uniforme de camouflage italien; mitraillette *Beretta M12*. **H3** uniforme de camouflage '*Woodland*' d'ancien modèle, porté avec gilet blindé *PASGT*, équipement de sangles *ALICE*, casque ancien modèle *M1*, et insigne de manche de drapeau national. **H4** Béret bleu foncé avec insigne d'aigle d'argent, uniforme de camouflage britannique *DPM* avec insignes de manche et gilet blindé britannique 'cinquième modèle'.

Farbtafeln

A1 Übliche grüne Kampfbekleidung, in Israel hergestellte *Keshet*-Panzerweste, Helm und individuelle '*Ephod*' Ausrüstung; '*Glion*' Gewehr (verkürzte Ausführung des '*Galil*'). Die braunen Stiefel sind das Kennzeichen der israelischen Fallschirmspringer. **A2** Spezial-Winterstiefel und -Anzug. Die Kanevas-Tasche am MG wird für Munitionsgurtel und leere Patronenhülsen benutzt. **A3** Das 1973 in grossen Mengen erbeutete Modell *RPG-7* wird heute in Israel hergestellt. Neben dem eigenen Gewehr müssen alle israelischen Infanteristen auch eine zweite Waffe oder einen zweiten Ausrüstungsgegenstand beherrschen. Das Brigadeabzeichen auf dem Uhrenarmband ist nicht offiziell.

B1 Die mit Stiefelpolitur geschwärzte Gurtausrüstung hat wasserdichte Siegel in den Taschen. Die *AK-47* ist die übliche Waffe der *IDF* Spezialeinhaiten. **B2** Israels Marineoffiziere haben die gleichen Ränge wie in der Armee; dies hier ist ein *Seren* oder Hauptmann wie bei der Armee. Die in den USA hergestellten feuerfesten *Nomex* Anzüge sind die normale Ausrüstung mit *Saar 4* Geschützbooten. Die blaue Marine-Drillmütze hat ein aufgemaltes, gelbes Geschützboot-Abzeichen. **B3** Die in Israel hergestellten Kopien des amerikanischen *K-2B* Fliegeranzugs und der *HGU-26P* Helm werden mit einem israelischen Anti-Schwerkraft-Anzug und Schwimmweste/Überlebensausrüstung getragen.

C1 Dieser Major trägt einen israelischen *Sarbal* Overall für Panzerbesatzung und den jüngsten Typ 602 Helm. **C2** Nachhutsoldaten haben altmodische individuelle Gurtausrüstung und M-16 Gewehre. **C3** Die Grenzsoldaten (*Mishmar Hagvul*) sind häufig *Druzen* oder arabisch sprechende orientalische Juden. Das grüne Barrett und die Rangabzeichen im britischen Stil sind typisch für diese Gattung.

D1 Offizier der *Phalange* Miliz mit israelischer Uniform; auf der Tasche das *Kata'eb* Parteiabzeichen und auf der Schulter das Abzeichen der Hauptquartier-Einheit. Das schwarze Barrett ist nicht Teil der offiziellen Ausrüstung. **D2** Typisch gemischte Ausrüstung mit israelischer Mütze, Stiefeln und Ausstattung mit amerikanischer '*BDU*' Uniform. **D3** Ausschliesslich israelische Bekleidung und Ausrüstung mit *Haddads* Milizabzeichen auf einer Schulterklappe im israelischen Stil.

E1 In Syrien hergestellte Kopie einer pakistanischen Tarnuniform mit sowjetischer Ausrüstung. **E2** Syrische Panzerbesatzungen werden nicht mit feuerfesten Anzügen ausgestattet. **E3** Syrischer 'Eidechsen'-Tarnanzug mit Jacke mit Muster ähnlich wie bei der amerikanischen *M-65*, dazu syrische Drillmütze.

F1 'Eidechsen'-Tarnanzughosen der *PLO*, die Sporttasche enthält *RPG-7* Raketen. **F2** Eines von mehreren palästinensischen Tarnmustern, im Land selbst hergestellt und für Offiziere, Ausbilder usw. vorgesehen. Das *Dragunov* Infrarotgewehr ist sehr gefragt. **F3** Die Uniform im Stil der irakischen Ausrüstungen legt die Vermutung nahe, dass sie zu einer in Bagdad stationierten Fraktion der *PLO* gehört. Viele *PLO*-Offiziere tragen rote Barrette.

G1 Im Land selbst hergestellte Kopie einer ägyptischen Fallschirmspringer-Tarnuniform; polnisches Angriffsgewehr mit angebautem Granatenwerfer. **G2** Marxistischer Guerilla mit rotem sowjetischem Helm mit der Aufschrift '*Mourabitoun*' und syrischer 'Eidechsen'-Tarnuniform. **G3** Die Mitglieder der Drusen-Miliz tragen verschiedene Uniformen und Ausrüstungen, je nach dem zur Zeit aktuellen Verbündeten. Dieser Mann trägt syrisch-pakistanische Tarnausrüstung und die typische wollene Drusenmütze.

H1 Reguläre französische Uniform und Ausrüstung; rotes Fallschirmspringer-Barrett mit Marine-Fallschirmspringer-Abzeichen; Landesfarben und Abzeichen der *11e Div. Para.*, dazu *FAMAS* Gewehr. **H2** Schwarzes Marine-Barrett mit Anker und Gewehr Abzeichen; der Markuslöwe als Bataillonsabzeichen auf der Brust und dem Halstuch; Landesfahnen auf dem Ärmel; Sterne auf dem Kragen; italienische Tarnuniform-Hosen; *Beretta M12* MG. **H3** Tarnuniform mit altem '*Woodland*'-Muster, mit *PASGT* Panzerweste getragen, *ALICE* Gurtausrüstung, altmodischer *M1* Helm und Landesfarben auf dem Ärmelabzeichen. **H4** Dunkelblaues Barrett mit silbernem Adlerabzeichen; britische DPM Tarnuniform mit Ärmelabzeichen; britische Panzerweste der 'Fünften Kolonne'.

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